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Boko Haram emerged as an independent group in Nigeria in the early 2000s and has since begun an insurgency, 
primarily operating in the northeastern region of Nigeria and increasingly further south and across the country’s 
borders. Researchers have conducted numerous studies analyzing the causes of the insurgency. However few 
have compared it to other insurgencies in Nigeria or Africa. This thesis analyzes the causes behind Boko 
Haram’s operations by drawing on the main debates within the literature on causes of insurgency in Africa.  
This analysis demonstrates how the academic literature on insurgency in Africa highlights important causes of 
Boko Haram’s insurgency, but it also identifies gaps in the literature. One of the most important findings of 
the thesis is that religion can be a dominate cause of conflict. I argue that one of the main causes of Boko 
Haram’s insurgency is the political competition over various issues between Nigerian Islamic organizations 
and political organizations. The most recent examples are the implementation of Sharia law across many of 
the states in northern Nigeria coupled with elite mobilization of youth groups affiliated with mosques. The role 
of religion as a cause of Boko Haram´s insurgency should not however be exaggerated as specific state 
weaknesses, especially a weak security apparatus, caused by democratization have also been one of the 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
The Nigerian military shelled the compound of the Islamic group Ahl al-sunna wa-l-jama‘a wa-l-hijra 
between the 26th and 31st of July 2009. The attack formed part of a large scale military effort to quell the 
group’s uprising in the states of Borno, Bauchi, Yobe, Gombe, Kano, and Katsina (see figure 1, page IV). 
Clashes between the group and the military during these days left more than 800 dead, including Ahl al-
sunna wa-l-jama‘a wa-l-hijra’s leader Mohammed Yusuf. He was captured by military forces and handed 
over to local police, who summarily executed him on the 30th of July. Ahl al-sunna wa-l-jama‘a wa-l-hijra 
reemerged the following year under a new name: Jama‘at ahl al-Sunna li-l-Da‘wa wa-l-jihad ‘ala Minhaj al-
Salaf, but the media and the general public were quick to assign the name Boko Haram.1 In September 2010, 
Boko Haram conducted a prison raid liberating at least a 100 of their members, and in the succeeding years 
the group has been responsible for thousands of deaths.2,3 These attacks have primarily been located in 
Nigeria´s North East geopolitical zone, but in recent years the group has attacked targets further south and 
even extended beyond Nigeria’s borders.4  
Boko Haram attracts a wealth of academic attention. One area of agreement is that the fighting belongs to the 
category of insurgency. A widely accepted definition of insurgency is that it involves  fighting between the 
government (and its agents) and   organized non-government groups with various political goals; the 
fighting results in at least (on average) 100 annual and at least 1,000 casualties overall; and at least 100 
deaths on both sides.5 This definition of insurgency categorizes insurgency as a method of fighting or a military 
practice involving, “small, lightly armed bands practicing guerrilla warfare6 from rural base areas.”7  
A significant amount of the academic literature focuses on the causes behind the insurgency but this is an area of 
disagreement. This thesis, too, asks the questions: What are the main causes of the Boko Haram insurgency? 
The answers to the research question are related to the academic literature on causes of insurgency in Africa 
and gives direction to further studies.  
                                                          
1 Roman Loimeier, “Boko Haram: The Development of a Militant Religious Movement in Nigeria”, Africa Spectrum, 
47:2-3 (2012):137-155. 
2 Manuel Reinert & Lou Garçon, “Boko Haram: A chronology”, in Marc-Antoine Pérouse de Montclos (ed), Boko 
Haram: Islamism, politics, security and the state in Nigeria, (African Studies Centre, 2014):237-245. 
3Armed Conflict Location & Event, “Real-Time Analysis of African Political Violence”, Conflict Trends, 33(2015):1-
13; Armed Conflict Location & Event, “Real-Time Analysis of African Political Violence”, Conflict Trends, 22 
(2014):1-14; Armed Conflict Location & Event, “Real-Time Analysis of African Political Violence”, Conflict Trends, 
10 (2013):1-10. 
4 M. Reinert & L. Garçon “Boko Haram: A chronology”, (2014):237-245. 
5 James Fearon & David Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War”, American Political Science Review, 
vol.97 (2003):75:1; this is furthermore consistent with the definitions of the Correlations of War (COW) Project 
and Michael Doyle & Nicholas Sambanis “International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis”, 
American Political Science Review, vol.94:4 (2000):779-801. 
6 Involving, for example, the use of surprise; hit-and-run attacks; high mobility (in attack and escape); etc. 
7 J. Fearon and D. Laitin, ”Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War”, (2003):75-90. 
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1.1. The Main Causes of the Boko Haram Insurgency Reflected in the Literature   
 
The most common explanation for Boko Haram’s insurgency is poor socio-economic conditions in the North 
as a consequence of bad governance. Successive Nigerian governments’ failures led to high levels of 
poverty, unemployment, insecurity and disenfranchisement, which in turn caused the insurgency.8 Some of 
these studies do involve a modest comparative element, identifying similarities between the 1980s’ 
Maitatsine insurgency and the current insurgency, emphasizing the continuous existence of deeply rooted 
socioeconomic problems in the North East.9 Others point out the failure of democracy introduced in 1999 to 
deliver significant socioeconomic progress across Nigeria, but in particular in the region where Boko Haram 
emerged.10 These studies are useful but “the link between the rise of group violence and socioeconomic 
underdevelopment remains unclear and the debate unsettled.”11 
A second set of explanations focus on the religious aspect of the Boko Haram insurgency. These studies 
understand Boko Haram as a natural consequence of northern Nigeria’s history of radical militant Islam 
dating back to Sheikh Uthman dan Fodio’s jihad and the creation of the Sokoto Caliphate in the early 19th 
century. Most religious explanations understand the religious drivers behind the insurgency as mainly 
domestic and point to the intersectionality of politics and religion in Nigeria.12 Politicians have used religious 
affiliations as a means to increase popularity and political power.13 These explanations contextualizes Boko 
                                                          
8 See Daniel Agbiboa, “No Retreat, No Surrender: Understanding The Religious Terrorism Of Boko Haram In Nigeria”, 
African Study Monographs, 34:2 (2013):65–84; Femi Ajayi & Ngozi Nwogwugwu, “Boko Haram And The Crisis Of 
Governance”,(2014); Paul Rogers, “Nigeria: The Generic Context Of Boko Haram Violence”, Monthly Global Security 
Briefing, (2012):1-5; Soloman A. Usman, “Unemployment And Poverty As Sources And Consequence Of Insecurity In 
Nigeria: The Boko Haram Insurgency Revisited”, African Journal Of Political Science And International Relations, 9:3 
(2015):90-99; Abimbola Adesoji, “The Boko Haram Uprising and Islamic Revivalism in Nigeria”, Africa Spectrum, 
45:2  (2010):95-108. 
9 See Iro Aghedo, “Old Wine in a New Bottle: Ideological and Operational Linkages Between Maitatsine and Boko 
Haram Revolts in Nigeria”, African Security, 7:4 (2014):229-250; Zachary Elkaim, “Boko Haram: The Rise, Success, 
and Continued Efficacy of the Insurgency in Nigeria”, International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT) working 
paper, 5 (2012):1-38. 
10 Mohammed Nuruddeen Suleiman & Mohammed Aminul Karim, “Cycle of Bad Governance and Corruption: The 
Rise of Boko Haram in Nigeria”, SAGE Open January-March, (2015):1-11. 
11 Daniel E. Agbigboa, “Peace at Daggers Drawn? Boko Haram and the State of Emergency in Nigeria”, Studies in 
Conflict & Terrorism, 37 (2014): 41–67.  
12 Roman Loimeier, “Boko Haram: The Development of a Militant Muslim Movement in Nigeria”, The Annual Review 
of Islam in Africa, 12:1 (2015):15-22;  
Abiodun Alao, ”Islamic radicalisation and violent extremism in Nigeria”, Conflict, Security & Development, 13:2 
(2013):127-147; Daniel Agbiboa, “The Ongoing Campaign of Terror in Nigeria: Boko Haram versus the State”. 
Stability: International Journal of Security & Development, 2(3):52 (2013):1-18; Murray Last, “The Pattern of Dissent: 
Boko haram in Nigeria 2009”, Annual Review of Islam in Africa, 10 (2009):7-11. 
13 Marc-Antoine Pérouse de Montclos, “Boko Haram and Politics: From Insurgency to Terrorism”, in Marc-Antoine 
Pérouse de Montclos(ed), Boko Haram: Islamism, politics, security and the state in Nigeria,  (African Studies 
Centre,2014):135-157; Gbemisola Animasawun & Luqman Saka, “Causal analysis of radical Islamism in northern 
Nigeria's Fourth Republic”, African Security Review, 22:4 (2013):216-231; Isaac Olawale Albert “An Alternative 
Explanation of Religious Fundamentalism in Northern Nigeria” (2014). 
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Haram within the corrupt behavioral patterns of Nigerian politicians, but have yet to explain why an 
insurgency developed and/or why Boko Haram did not remain a small fringe group. Some studies of the 
religious aspects of the insurgency illuminate the religious rationale but these studies fail to provide 
convincing accounts of where and how Boko Haram fits into regional religious dynamics.  Some studies see 
Boko Haram connected to the notion of a Global Jihad, suggesting that the al-Qaeda network helped 
establish Boko Haram to join in the fight against the West.14 The main issue with this explanation is the lack 
of Nigerian contextualization and minimal evidence, underlined by the lack of fatwas issued by other Islamic 
organizations expressing support for Boko Haram, and that Boko Haram does not issue fatwas themselves.15  
The religious explanation holds some currency. Boko Haram was an established Islamic group around the 
compound of the Ibn Taymiyyah Mosque in Maiduguri in the far northeastern corner of Nigeria. The 
geographical epicenter is significant for how to categorize Boko Haram, because the North of Nigeria is 
historically more connected to the Islamic world of North Africa, the Middle East and beyond, through the 
trans-Saharan trade than Africa south of the rain forest belt. Islam was therefore introduced around the 9th 
century. From then the religion developed and gained popularity, becoming the foundation for empires and 
caliphates throughout the northern region of the geographical entity now known as Nigeria.16 Islam in 
Nigeria is extremely vibrant and the three major Islamic traditions, Shiite, Sunni and Sufi, co-exist and 
interact with Nigerian politics in one way or another. The Boko Haram insurgency, although homegrown, 
might well be comparable to insurgencies of the Islamic world: the Islamic Salvation Front in Algeria, the 
Islamic Group in Egypt, the Taliban in Afghanistan, and other groups in Chechnya, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, 
Kashmir, the Israeli-occupied Palestinian territories, Philippines, Syria, Pakistan, Lebanon, Tajikistan, 
Uzbekistan, and Yemen.17    
Today, most Islamic insurgencies are often ideologically lumped together under the broad label of radical 
Salafism.18 But as Hegghammer points out “The notion of a global Salafi (or takfiri or Jihadi-Salafi) 
                                                          
14 A. Alao, “Islamic radicalisation and violent extremism in Nigeria”(2013):127-147; Yonah Alexander, “Special 
Update Report Terrorism in North, West, & Central Africa: From 9/11 to the Arab Spring”, Special Update 
Report,(2012); Herman J. Cohen, “Al Qaeda in Africa: The Creeping Menace to Sub-Sahara's 500 Million Muslims”, 
American Foreign Policy Interests: The Journal of the National Committee on American Foreign Policy, 35:2 
(2013):63-69; Shannon Connel, ”To Be or Not To Be: Is Boko Haram a Foreign Terrorist Organization?”,  Global 
Security Studies, 3:3 (2012):87-93; Alex Thurston, “Threat of Militancy in Nigeria”, Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, 1 Sep. 2011,  <http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/09/01/threat-of-militancy-in-nigeri> (Retrieved 
7 May 2015). 
15 David Cook, Boko Haram: A New Islamic State in Nigeria, (Rice University: James A. Baker Iii Institute for Public 
Policy, 2014):7.  
16 S.J. Hogen & A.H.M. Kirk-Greene, The Emirates of Northern Nigeria: A Preliminary Survey of their Historical 
Traditions, (London: Oxford University Press, London, 1966). 
17 Mohammed M. Hafez, Repression and Resistance in the Islamic World, (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003). 
18 See Quitan Wiktorowicz, “Anatomy of the Salafi Movement”, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 29 (2006):207-239; 
Thomas Hegghammer, “Jihadi-Salafis or Revolutionaries? On Religion and Politics in the Study of Militant Islamism”, 
in Roel Meiger (ed.), Global Salafism: Islam’s New Religious Movement (London: Hurst and Company, 2009):244-266; 
Barry Rubin, “Islamic Radicalism in the Middle East: A Survey & Balance sheet”, Middle East Review of International 
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movement, while appealing as a collective noun, is in fact very problematic, because the actors subsumed in 
this category do not share political preferences. Salafis around the world work for different political agendas 
and thus pull in different directions.”19 Understanding and examining the causes of Boko Haram’s 
insurgency framed in ideological terms therefore seems to confuse the topic more so than illuminate 
significant factors.  
Finally, a set of explanations focuses on the Sahel-belt and how the insurgency is a result of regional 
instability. In this explanation, the causality lies outside of Nigeria.  Regional instability derives from porous 
borders and how easily funds, arms, drugs, and veterans of foreign wars can move between countries. Al-
Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) owes its development to these same regional forces.20 While the 
explanation points out relevant factors of Boko Haram’s development, these studies tend to confuse cause 
and consequence; just as the fighting of al-Shabaab has spilled over into neighboring territories, so too has 
the fighting of Boko Haram spilled over into Chad, Cameroon and Niger.21     
The different explanations are to some extent unsurprising. The approach of many scholars in explaining the 
causes of insurgency is to focus on the favorable practical conditions, especially the lack of resources to fight 
(crippling incumbents and favoring rebels); terrain that enables insurgents’ survival; large cohorts of young 
male populations; and political instability.22 Even when a society contains many causes for an insurgency, the 
actual insurgency depends on the practical conditions favoring the insurgency. And conditions favoring 
insurgency have no necessary connection to societal causes of insurgency. Any political agenda and/or 
ideology - anti-colonialism, jihadism, communism, anti-communism, religion, secularism, etc. - can engage in 
insurgency. 
It is noticeable that despite the similarity in the research methods used to arrive at answers, the existing 
answers to the question about the main causes of the Boko Haram insurgency are different. The most 
common method in researching Boko Haram is the case study. There is an obvious lack of studies either 
comparing Boko Haram to Nigeria’s other insurgencies such as the Movement for the Actualization of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
Affairs, 2:2 (1998):17-24; Fawaz Gerges, The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global,(London: Cambridge University 
Press,  2005); S.K Malik, The Quranic Concept of War, (Delhi: Adam Publishers & Distributors, 1992). 
19 Thomas Hegghammer,“Jihadi-Salafis or Revolutionaries? On Religion and Politics in the Study of Militant 
Islamism”, (2009):264. 
20 Micha’el Tanchum, “Al-Qa‘ida’s West African Advance: Nigeria’s Boko Haram, Mali’s Touareg, and the Spread of 
Salafi Jihadism”, Israel Journal of foreign Affair, 6:2 (2012):75-90; Frank Cilluffo, Joseph Clark, & Clinton Watts, 
“Pardon The Pivot, What About Africa? African lessons for avoiding myopic national security”, HSPI Issue Brief, 17 
(2012); Ayodeji Anthony Aduloju, Abimbola Opanike & Lawrence O. Adenipekun, “Boko Haram Insurgency In 
North-Eastern Nigeria And Its Implications For Security And Stability In West African Sub-Region”, International 
Journal of Development and Conflict, 4 (2014):102-107; James J.F. Forest, “Confronting the Terrorism of Boko Haram 
in Nigeria”, JSOU Report 12:5 (2012). 
21 M. Reinert & L. Garçon “Boko Haram: A chronology”, (2014):237-245. 
22 J. Fearon and D. Laitin, ”Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War”, (2003):75-90. 
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Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), the Movement of the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEMD) 
groups, or the Oodua People’s Congress (OPC), or to other insurgencies in Africa.  
This thesis seeks to address this gap in research by drawing on the broader scholarly literature, especially its 
major debates and comparative methods, about the causes of insurgency in Africa, including previous 
insurgencies in Nigeria.  The study confines itself to the scholarship concerned with insurgencies in the 
independent states of sub-Saharan Africa.  
1.2. Method and Evidence 
 
This study is a theory testing case-study in the sense that it relates the main causes of Boko Haram’s 
insurgency (the case) to the debates about the causes of insurgency in Africa (the theory). As such, the study 
is located within Lijphart’s description of a theory-generating case study.23 Greed, Grievance, Ethnicity and 
the State, explain the main causes of insurgency present in the academic literature, and each is used as 
analytical categories to explore the causes of Boko Haram’ insurgency.  
The intent is to contribute to general understandings of insurgency in Africa by indicating where the broader 
literature fails to explain what causes insurgency while identifying new dynamics for further studies. The 
thesis could also point towards a conceptualization of Islamic insurgencies in Africa, and potentially beyond.  
Caution is exercised when it comes to reliable evidence about Boko Haram’s actions. The massacres of Doro 
Gowon and Baga in early 2015 underline this difficulty. Reports mention casualties anywhere between 150 
and 2,000.24,25 Misreporting data is commonplace in reports about conflict. Whereas authorities have 
incentive to keep numbers low to illustrate the success of the counter-insurgency (COIN) strategy, 
sensationalist and popular media inflate numbers to increase sales. Actual numbers are often difficult to 
obtain or impossible to estimate.26 It’s not only casualties and the factuality of events that are often veiled in 
mystery. Only fragmented information is available on the organizational structure, recruits, sponsors, and 
whereabouts of the group, and good analysis is based on carefully picked pieces of information and scrutiny 
of unreliable sources. Some aspects of Boko Haram are however uncontested and relatively detailed 
                                                          
23 Arend Lijphart, ”Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method”, The American Political Science Review, 65:3 
(1971):682-693. 
24 Camillus Eboh & Tim Cocks, ”Nigeria's military says 150 killed in Boko Haram clashes in Baga”, Reuters, 12 Jan. 
2015, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/01/12/us-nigeria-violence-idUSKBN0KL26J20150112> (retrieved 27 
January 2015). 
25 Mausi Segun,”Dispatches: What Really Happened in Baga, Nigeria?”, Human Rights Watch, 14 Jan. 2015, 
<http://www.hrw.org/news/2015/01/14/dispatches-what-really-happened-baga-nigeria> (retrieved 27 Jan. 2015).  
26 Ryan Cummings, ”COMMENT: Assessing the Baga massacre death toll”, Africa Check, 14 Jan. 2015, 
http://africacheck.org/2015/01/14/comment-assessing-the-baga-massacre-death-toll/ (retrieved 27 Jan. 2015). 
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information is available, especially pertaining to the group’s actions, including the use of suicide bombings, 
kidnapping, and the use of shocking violence.   
This study is focused on the causes of Boko Haram’s insurgency and is therefore heavily reliant on 
secondary data, in the form of other studies and analyses. Newspaper articles and video clips are rarely used 
as they are difficult to verify. Instead the study relies on firsthand accounts provided by Human Right Watch, 
International Crisis Group and the reports from Amnesty International to describe specific events. Even 
when these reports are used, multiple sources are consulted to verify specific accounts, and unreliable 
sources are indicated when necessary. The second chapter on causes of insurgency in independent Africa 
draws on a large volume of studies and strives to include both quantitative and qualitative studies in the 
discussion. Caution is also exercised in the conclusions. The Boko Haram insurgency has yet to end: 
conclusions and suggestions are thus conditional. 
1.3. Chapter Outline 
 
Chapter 2 explores the main debates and arguments within the literature on causes of insurgency in 
independent Africa. Greed, Grievance, Ethnicity and the State, are the main debates and each are explored 
individually to illuminate where consensus has been reached, and to point out the more inconclusive aspects 
of the debate. Chapter 3 firstly provides a descriptive history of the group: its emergence, the build up to the 
crucial clashes with the Nigerian police and military in June of 2009, its reemergence a year later and a brief 
description of the group´s history since its reemergence. The chapter then applies each of the four debates 
mentioned above to explore how the case study contributes to the debates. As evident by Boko Haram´s 
emergence, rivalry between religious organizations in northern Nigeria has been a relatively large factor, but 
the debate on religion as a cause of insurgency in Africa is underdeveloped and was therefore left out of 
chapter 2. Religion is explored as cause of Boko Haram´s insurgency to point out novel dynamics for a 
debate on how religion can be understood as a cause of insurgency. Chapter 4 discusses these findings 
against the general debates on insurgency, and gives direction to new enquiries that can further the literature 






Chapter 2: Causes of Insurgency in Africa  
 
The objective of this chapter is to discuss the academic literature on causes of insurgency in Africa. 
The literature can broadly be divided into four separate debates: 
Greed-Resource is the first debate and refers to the notion that the likelihood of insurgency is best correlated 
with monetary gains associated with natural resource exploitation. Grievance is often introduced as 
oppositional to Greed-explanations but the two explanations are not necessarily mutually exclusive 
categories. It is safe to say that some level of grievance is necessary for a specific group to pick up arms and 
initiate the costly affair of insurgency. Ethnicity, in terms of individual identity and/or the pattern of 
differences in society, has been widely discussed as a cause of conflict in Africa, especially in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Rwanda, and the Sudan. As insurgency per definition is an armed 
rebellion against the state, it leads to many State or Governance-explanations. Religion has featured in a 
significant amount of conflicts across the continent, yet has not received the same amount of attention as any 
of the other explanations. Some studies have focused on religion and insurgency, but this is usually in 
relation to traditional African religions and how they have legitimized behavior in conflict.27 As a cause of 
insurgency, the religious debate is underdeveloped and therefore excluded from the chapter but is pursued in 
chapter 3’s analysis of Boko Haram, in order to give direction for a debate on religion as a cause of 
insurgency in Africa.    
In all the types of explanations, it is evident that what scholars try to explain – their dependent variable, in 
others words - will vary, for example ‘civil war’; ‘conflict’;  ‘violence’; and ‘war’. For the purposes of this 
review, these conceptual differences will be disregarded, as long as the dependent variable involves political 
violence, defined broadly as “collective attacks within a political community against the political regime, its 






                                                          
27 See for example; David Ian. Guns & Rain: Guerrillas & Spirit Mediums in Zimbabwe (London : James Curry; 
Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1985); Tim Allen, & Koen Vlassenroot (eds.), The Lord’s 
Resistance Army: Myth and Reality, (London & New York: Zed Books, 2010). 





A significant number of African economies are considerably dependent on natural resource exploitation.29 It 
is therefore not surprising that natural resources play a role in explaining insurgency in Africa, and have been 
a key aspect of academic debates. 
Collier and Hoeffler econometrically examined if greed or grievance is the cause of civil war in Africa. 
Based on their findings, they argue that “conflicts are far more likely to be caused by economic opportunities 
than by grievance,”30 and that a large, poor, dispersed population significantly increases the risk of conflict. 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita, economic growth rate and primary commodity exports relative to 
national income are used as proxies for economic opportunity. That is, if a country has a low GDP per capita, 
a declining national income and high economic reliance on primary commodity export it will have a higher 
probability of civil war.  Collier and Hoeffler stress the arbitrary nature of their proxies, and interpret low 
GDP per capita to be a proxy for either cheap rebel labor or low military capability of the government. 
Regardless of how to interpret the proxy, they find that lower GDP per capita increases the risk of conflict. 
They understand their second proxy, higher national economic growth, to indicate the availability of jobs. 
Increase in job opportunities means that the cost of recruitment to a potential insurgency is increased. The 
last factor, reliance on primary exports (such as oil, diamonds, metals, food, and beverages) has a strong 
correlation with civil war and they explain this relationship with the level of accessible funds for 
governments and insurgents alike. Beyond the three proxies for economic opportunity is a dispersed 
population, which they understand as a proxy for military feasibility: low population density increases the 
difficult for government to conduct a successful COIN campaign.31  
The greed-argument resonated with the international community because it could be used to argue for 
straight forward policy initiatives, through sanctions on international trade of natural resource.32 But the 
proxies are ambiguous as they do not necessarily measure what they were intended for and it is difficult to 
draw a conclusion on natural resources´ causality for insurgency. As mentioned by Collier and Hoeffler, 
GDP per capita might be a proxy for both military capacity and cheap rebel labor, and the causal relationship 
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is unclear.33 The assumption that a decline in economic growth is a proxy for lower employment opportunity 
and therefore a decrease in the cost of rebel labor is problematic because it does not take into account that 
civil wars usually follow a period of increased political violence, which often negatively affects the 
economy. Civil war in itself will usually also have a negative effect on economic growth so a high 
correlation between the two are self-evident without the latter necessarily being the cause of the former.34
    
The idea that economic reliance on primary commodity export increases the likelihood of civil war provokes 
a number of further studies that seek to test this relationship using a better proxy for the availability of 
natural resources. Ross finds that there is no significant relationship between primary commodities and the 
onset of civil war.35 Buhaug and Rød find strong evidence that proximate lootable diamonds increases the 
risk of civil war.36 Lujala, Gleditsch and Gilmore find that following the end of the Cold War the existence 
of diamonds in a given country increases the risk of civil war.37 However in Humphreys´ study of the onset 
of civil war and diamond production, he does not find any significant relationship.38 This is consistent with 
the view that conflicts are not caused by the availability of natural resources, or greed, but that these factors 
might play an important role for some insurgents as the conflict develops.39   
The main critique of the greed-thesis is therefore the confusion of causality and correlation, as it is possible 
to draw two conclusions from above mentioned studies: insurgency is either initiated for profit through 
occupation of minefields, control of roadblocks etc. or insurgencies integrate these economic activities to 
sustain their insurgency.40 In terms of greed or natural resources as a cause of insurgency in Africa, the 
current data does not allow for a more complex conclusion other than insurgency tends to occur more so in 
environments characterized by resources richness than scarcity.      
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 2.2-Grievance  
 
As mentioned in the introduction to the chapter, it is commonsensical that a certain level of grievance is 
required for a group to pick up weapons and initiate an insurgency campaign. Grievance is here defined, 
according to Gurr’s Relative Deprivation thesis, as the discrepancy between people’s expectation and what 
they actually have.41 A number of studies have focused on grievance and insurgency. Collier and Hoeffler 
find that objective grievance measured by individual inequality and political repression holds very little 
significance for civil war. They explain this by the widespread existence of groups with grievances. That is, 
there are simply too many groups with grievances for that to be a main cause of civil war.42 Østby, Nordås 
and Rød argue that Collier and Hoeffler‘s use of a country-aggregated Gini coefficient as a proxy for 
inequality does not capture the dynamics of civil war as the Gini coefficient measures individual inequality, 
or vertical inequality, and civil war takes place between groups. Instead Østby et al. test group-based 
inequality, or horizontal inequality, regionally divided. Using the welfare measurements household assets 
and level of education as a proxy for group based grievance horizontal inequality, they find that if the 
regional welfare is below the national average it increases the risk of conflict breaking out in that specific 
region. If combined with the existence of natural resources in the region the risk of conflict is further 
increased. Their finding supports the conclusion of the previous section: resource rich environments have a 
higher risk of conflict. 
Østby et al. furthermore find that it is not only interregional disparity that increases the risk of civil war but 
also intraregional inequality, as it decreases recruitment and mobilizing cost while the elite have relatively 
more resources for recruitment and mobilization.43 Stewart includes cases outside Africa, but supports Østby 
et al.´s findings by pointing to the increased risk of civil war if specific horizontal inequalities exist. Stewart 
defines horizontal inequalities as perceived group-based inequalities and identifies four categories: 
economic, social, cultural and political. Economic horizontal inequalities include employment opportunity, 
income levels and general access to assets. Social inequalities include access to education, health care, 
housing etc. Cultural inequalities include recognition of languages, customs, norms etc. Political inequalities 
include political opportunity and access to power: control of presidency, representation in the cabinet and 
parliament etc. and is associated with the elites of the group. Stewart finds that all types of inequalities can 
lead to conflict but political inequalities have the highest single significance for conflict as it motivates 
political leaders to mobilize their constituency. If the elite previously held power the significance is 
increased. High socioeconomic inequality combined with high political inequalities has the highest 
                                                          
41 T. Gurr, Why Men Rebel, (1971):23-24. 
42 P. Collier & A. Hoeffler, “On the Incidence of Civil War in Africa”, (2002):13-28. 
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correlation with conflict.44 The two studies point out that while economic, cultural, and social horizontal 
inequalities can lead to conflict, the highest risk for conflict is associated with elite mobilization.      
 
The above mentioned studies refer to Gurr´s relative deprivation thesis as a point of departure for their 
research by assuming that sufficient frustration will lead to political violence. While the main variable of 
Gurr´s thesis is relative deprivation or frustration, understood as discrepancy between a group´s expectation 
and their actual capability, he introduced two other important variables: which political institutions the 
political violence is directed against (legitimacy) and the coercive balance between the two opponents. The 
first variable dictates which issues can trigger the application of political violence, and the second is a 
determinant for the type of political violence applied: riot, turmoil, coup d´état, civil war etc.45 Neither Østby 
et al. nor Stewart consider these two intervening variables. Another important critique is of their 
methodology, more particularly the conversion of observable statistics (welfare measurements and various 
political, economic, social and cultural inequalities measurements) to perception. Østby et al. and Stewart 
base their study on the assumption that macro indicators of inequality can translate into people’s perceived 
inequality. This is problematic because a group might objectively be poor, or deprived, but not perceive 
themselves as poor. Objective measures might not be good proxies for perceptions. Taking the critique into 
account, the above mentioned studies suggest that insurgency is more likely to occur in environments 
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Conflicts in Rwanda, Congo, Uganda, Burundi, Kenya, and Sudan have often been described as ethnic 
conflicts, fueled by some form of primordial hatred between ethnic groups. Considering the high degree of 
ethnic diversity in Africa, both across the continent and within countries, it seems counterintuitive that 
primordial ethnic hatred is the key to understand the causes of insurgency. If so, it is safe to assume that 
there would be a much higher number of insurgencies on the continent. The primordial understanding of 
ethnicity is however a minority position and the dominant interpretation is that ethnic differences are 
constructed over time and often instrumentalized. For the purpose of this thesis, ethnicity is defined as 
difference. On a micro-level, ethnicity is about differences in individuals´ identity, but when it operates on a 
macro-level, ethnicity usually refers to patterns of differences in the whole society. As insurgency is a group 
activity, this section focuses on the macro-level.      
There is little evidence to support a claim that ethnic differences are the primary cause of insurgency. Collier 
and Hoeffler find that high ethnic diversity holds little significance for insurgency and explains this by the 
cost of ethnic group mobilization: if an insurgency is mobilized on the basis of one of many smaller ethnic 
groups in a country, it will automatically exclude the recruitment of other ethnic identities to the same 
insurgency.46 Fearon and Laitin point out that ethnic dominance, defined as between 45% and 95% of the 
population belonging to one ethnic group, increases the risk of insurgency.47 In this, they supplement Collier 
and Hoeffler´s finding by stating that a dominant ethnic group would not need to mobilize outside that ethnic 
group and the cost of mobilization is therefore lower. These two studies are global, not confined to African 
cases, but they point out this valuable finding on ethnicity. However it requires qualification in an African 
context.       
Posner´s case study of the Chewa and Tumbuka, two ethnic groups both living in the border regions of 
Zambia and Malawi, finds that the relative size of a specific ethnic group proportional to the national 
population determines if that ethnic group is politically mobilized or not. Both the political and ethnic 
distinctions between the Chewa and the Tumbuka become important when the groups constitute a large 
enough percentage of the national population to be viable political platformS.48 Even though Posner does not 
define ethnic dominance in the two countries, his findings support Collier and Hoeffler, and Fearon and 
Laitin, as ethnic mobilization of the two groups in Malawi is a viable option as they constitute a significant 
voter base, while in Zambia they are simply too small and are therefore not mobilized.  
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48 Daniel Posner, “The political Salience of Cultural Difference: Why Chewas and Tumbukas Are Allies in Zambia and 
Adversaries in Malawi”, American Political Science Review, 98:4 (2004):529-545.  
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Bates argues that when a state determines legal access to land based on ethnic labels, these can become lines 
of division when land access is threatened. Instability increases tension between those who have a legal right 
to land and those that do not. As political elites instrumentally use ethnic labels to gather political support in 
turbulent times, frequently in an exchange of political goods in the form of securing lands rights, these 
tensions are further amplified.49 Akokpari’s study of Côte d'Ivoire supports this argument by concluding that 
the insurgencies often revolves around ethnicity in a rhetorical sense, but fundamentally the conflict revolves 
around state resources “exacerbated by a struggle over citizenship and more specifically, who is legitimately 
entitled to participate in the struggle.”50 Both claims underline the importance of ethnicity as a cause of 
insurgency and only vaguely refers to the notion of common heritage, fate, culture and physical 
appearance.51 Instead ethnicity can be a cause of insurgency when ethnic labels transcend their cultural 
connotations and define which groups that have, or do not have, access to political goods.  
Mamdani examines the foreigner/indigenousness historical dynamic in Rwanda and finds that ethnic labels 
of Hutu and Tutsi were relatively fluid before the colonial period. Intermarriage was widely acceptable and 
ethnicity was usually transferred through patriarchal lines. The Belgian Colonial administration made the 
two ethnic identities static by institutionalizing them as bipolar legal entities, making them political 
identities. Tutsi, non-natives, were given legal privileges not offered to the natives, Hutu. The political 
identities therefore became significant during various outbreaks of political violence in post-colonial 
Rwanda, and especially during the Rwandan civil war initiated in 1990 and following genocide.52 Mamdani´s 
finding not only accentuates the point made above: that ethnic labels can form the basis for insurgency when 
they include/exclude access to specific rights or political goods (they become political identities), but also 
that ethnic labels are constructed as they change over time.    
Ethnicity is important as a cause of insurgency when the labels are also political identities that can grant 
access to political goods and/or is viable as a platform for political mobilization. When used instrumentally it 
creates lines of division, especially regarding political goods distributed by the state.53 Identities are dynamic 
and constructed, meaning that ethnic labels can change in importance over time. This latter point is 
underlined by their non-monolithic nature indicated by Ekeh.54 It is therefore not the ethnic labels by 
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themselves that can be the cause of insurgency, but when they are facilitated to advance specific political 


























The previous section on ethnicity as a cause of insurgency highlights the centrality of the state as the 
distributor of political goods, and despite their low success rate, most insurgencies were launched in an 
attempt to capture the state or carve out a section of the state´s territory. More contemporary insurgencies 
may not have attempted to capture the national capital, or have the capacity to this end, but state policies and 
power distribution have impacted their emergence. To some extent, insurgency can be understood as a 
response to the state’s dysfunctional political institutions.55 This section presents three themes with relevance 
for the role of the state: weak states; elite political behavior; and ungoverned spaces.  
2.4.1-Weak States  
 
A categorization of weak state usually focuses on the state’s effectiveness in delivering goods and services to 
the population, usually including sustainable economic growth, legitimate institutions, ensuring the 
population’s safety, controlling territory etc.56 The concept is problematic because it does not further our 
understanding of the specific state’s impact on insurgency. By suggesting a general status of weak state, the 
concept neglects that many states have significant weaknesses in specific sectors and strengths in others. By 
one measure of weak state from 2008, Mali scored extremely low on the social welfare indicator but very 
high on the security indicator while Sri Lanka scored very low on the security indicator but very high on the 
social welfare indicator, yet both states are labeled weak states despite significant differences in strengths.57 
In relation to insurgency exploring the specific dynamics of weakness have more explanatory value. Weak 
states can be a dominant cause of insurgency as they continuously fail the expectations of their citizens, 
hence they create grievance; are unable to fill the grievance void; or cannot co-opt the ethnic, religious or 
regional political elites; all of which pave the way for political inequality or exclusion.58 When a state has a 
weak security apparatus, it cannot adequately handle external and internal security threats. External threats 
present a risk because a weak security apparatus will not be able to fend of neighboring countries’ military or 
foreign insurgencies, as have been the case in Sierra Leone and Zaire (later the DRC).59 In terms of internal 
threats, security apparatus with low capacity will tend to either provoke insurgency by applying a too harsh 
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of a response to initial threats because they cannot distinguish between criminal activity and insurgencies in 
their initial stages, or motivate insurgency as they can act with impunity.60  
2.4.2-Elite Political Behavior: Neopatrimonialism, Democratization, and Predatory Behavior  
 
Instead of looking at state weakness, some literature understands the elite political behavior in Africa as 
neopatrimonialism. Neopatrimonialism and associated political behaviors have often been identified as a 
potential cause of insurgency in Africa.61 Neopatrimonialism can be understood as the interaction between 
the rational-legal and patrimonial authority as understood by Weber,62 where public norms are “formal and 
rational, but their social practice is often personal and informal.”63 As a political system based on 
neopatrimonial logic is inherently exclusive to the majority, while benefitting the few well-connected elites, 
it has difficulty in appeasing and accommodating the various grievances that has potential to cause 
insurgency. And it is therefore”…threats of retribution against opponents rather than general satisfaction 
with the status quo,”64  and a continuous flow of patronage to the well-connected elites, that will keep the 
system relatively stable. Political elites will often sponsor groups who can ensure violent retribution and 
maintain weak state institutions, including a weak security apparatus, to avoid radical and significant 
challengers to the system. If the patronage network begins to fail, the alliances that ensured the relative 
stability of the state system breaks down and instead of upholding their alliance to the center, well-placed 
regional or local leaders within the network will begin to pursue power by capturing local power centers, 
usually by military means. It is not however the system of neopatrimonialism itself that is under attack but 
the failure of the state’s leader to distribute state resources along the existing network of patronage. Williams 
argues that neopatrimonialism does not automatically cause insurgency but as its stability rests on the 
continuous ability of a ruler to sustain his patronage network; political and economic shocks can lead to state 
disintegration and the rise of insurgencies. An economic shock can come in the form of a drop in commodity 
prices or loss of development aid and a political shock will usually come in the form of democratization 
highly encouraged or demanded from external creditors.65  
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A very robust finding on the relationship between civil war, other forms of political instability, and regime 
type is that partial or unconsolidated democracies with factionalism have a higher risk of political 
instability.66 While Williams explains the relationship as due to the increase of political competition 
associated with democracy,67 Bates argues that African leaders faced with democratization have a tendency 
to behave in a way that causes significant and specific state weakness, or failure, which can lead to political 
instability and insurgency. When leaders´ present or future income is at risk due to democratization in non-
democratic countries, defeat in elections in democratic countries or drop in revenue, they will begin to reap 
rewards from the wealth of state while they still have access to them, simply stealing state resources and 
thereby weakening the state institutions, including the security sector. In Sierra Leone, for example, 
successive leaders had continuously weakened state institutions so when the Revolutionary United Front 
(RUF) crossed the border from Liberia, there was a completely lack of an effective army to fend them off. 
There was furthermore little incentive for the population to defend the incumbent government as it frequently 
applied violence against its citizens as a means to stay in office.68 One consequence of a state not having an 
effective security apparatus is that people will pick up arms and form militias, which has the potential to 
develop into a full scale insurgency.69 Another major consequence of a weakened security sector is that 
neither the military nor the police are paid salaries and instead they riot, loot, sell their weapons, and even 
take up arms against government.70 Effectively the state loses the “monopoly over the means of coercion” 
and allows for pockets of ungoverned spaces.71 
2.4.3-Ungoverned Spaces  
 
Nigeria, the DRC, Ethiopia, Sudan, Angola and South Africa, are the big African states in terms of 
population size and territory. While South Africa is the odd one out as the country has managed to build a 
strong bureaucratic state with a well-developed transport and communication infrastructure, the other five all 
face common challenges and been able to find viable solutions. The challenge has been how to govern 
effectively across a vast territory. All five countries have enclaves of their territory, which falls outside 
government control.72 Control of territory, monopoly of violence73, empirical sovereignty74 or project of 
                                                          
66 Jack A. Goldstone, Robert H. Bates, David L. Epstein, Ted Robert Gurr, Michael B. Lustik, Monty G. Marshall, Jay 
Ulfelder & Mark Woodward, “A Global Model for Forecasting Political Instability”, American Journal of Political 
Science Vol. 54: 1 (2010):190–208.  
67 Williams, War & Conflict in Africa, (2011):55-71. 
68 W. Reno, Warlord Politics and African State, (1998) 
69 R. H. Bates, When Things Fell Apart, (2008).  
70 Robert H. Bates, “Political Conflict and State Failure”, in Benno J. Ndulu, Stephen A. O'Connell, Robert H. Bates, 
Paul Collier, and Chukwuma C. Soludo (eds.) Vol. 1 of The Political Economy of Economic Growth in Africa, 1960- 
2000 (Cambridge University Press,2008):249-296. 
71 Robert H. Bates, “State Failure”, Annual Review of Political Science vol. 11 (2008):2. 




power across vast distances with often cumbersomely geography have been a challenge for African leaders 
throughout history75, and the current trend is that insurgency emerges on the periphery of state control, often 
in rural areas, close to international border.76,77 In this sense, “generalized disappointment if not disaffection 
toward state institutions made insurgency possible. Their often weak hold on the rural periphery made 
rebellion thinkable.”78 As argued by Bates, the lack of a monopoly of violence in certain regions of a country 
is a direct consequence of a ruler´s predatory behavior towards state institutions especially the security 
sector, consequentially causing a hollow military.79 Ungoverned should however be understood as a 
spectrum ranging from the complete absence of government to the lack of delivery on key services 
associated with government to full delivery of services. In the North Kivu of eastern DRC it has been argued 
that there is no central authority present, effectively anarchy as understood in the general International 
Relations theory, and this has caused a security dilemma, where the increase of one group´s security 
decreases the security of others: The zero-sum power game.80 Other places might not however have 
experienced the same level of government absence.      
2.4.4-The State as a Cause of Insurgency  
 
When examining the causality between the state and insurgency, a general notion of weak state does not 
illuminate the intricate dynamics causing insurgency. It is instead necessary to look at how elite political 
behavior led to specific weakness of the state, and further examine these weaknesses as a cause of 
insurgency. Williams points to the high risk of insurgency associated with neopatrimonial politics where 
economic shocks can lead to disintegration and democratization can increase violent political competition. 
Bates also points out the threats associated with democratization and economic shocks, but explains that it is 
predatory behavior of rulers that is the main cause of insurgency. Both dynamics can however leave spaces 
ungoverned where insurgencies have a chance to avoid military. 
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2.5-Greed, Grievance, Ethnicity or the State 
 
The four debates in this chapter collectively represent the literature on dominant causes of insurgency in 
Africa. The literature on greed suffers from a confusion of correlation and causality, and the strongest 
conclusion to draw from here is that insurgency tends to take place in resource rich environments. The 
debate on grievance underlines that a certain level of grievance caused by economic, cultural, or welfare 
inequalities can lead to insurgency but the most consequential factor is elites’ political marginalization. 
Debates on ethnicity suggest that primordial hatred makes little sense as a cause of conflict and neither does 
innate cultural differences. Instead, it is when an ethnic identity can be used to advance specific interest often 
associated with the distribution of the state’s resources that it will be mobilized. In this case, the ethnic 
identity transcends what is usually associated with ethnicity (common heritage, fate, culture and physical 
appearance) to become a political identity.81 Weakness of state institutions is caused by elites’ political 
reaction, or behavior, to political or economic shocks and can cause insurgency as the state is inadequately 
equipped to handle challenges associated with governance. The loss of the monopoly on violence is 
especially problematic as infant insurgencies can avoid military defeat and have time and space to grow. 
Just as no conflict is entirely unique, no conflicts are entirely alike so it is possible to draw similarities 
between the above discussed debates and the thesis’ case study: Boko Haram, but also identify differences 
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Chapter 3: Analysis 
 
The objective of this chapter is to provide an analysis of the main causes of Boko Haram’s insurgency based 
on the debates on insurgency in Africa, and to introduce religion as a cause of insurgency. The chapter firstly 
provides an explanation of the significance of the name: Boko Haram, and stresses the issues connected to 
the use of the name. This is followed by a timeline from the mid-1990s up to more recent events. The chapter 
goes on to explore each of the debates presented in the previous chapter in relations to Boko Haram then 
focuses on the religious dynamics.  
3.1-Boko Haram: What is in a Name 
 
A good point of departure for any study of Boko Haram is with the name. Boko Haram, The Nigerian 
Taliban, Yusufiyya, Ahl-Sunna wal Jamma (Companions of the Prophet),82 Ahl al-Sunna li’l-Da’wa wa’l-
Jihad ‘ala Minhaj al-Salaf (the Association of the People of the Sunna for the Missionary Call and the 
Armed Struggle), 83 and most recently the Islamic State's West Africa Province (ISWAP),84 have all been 
used as names for the group. Some names originate from the group itself and others have been applied to the 
group by outsiders, typically the media. The best known is of course Boko Haram, which was given to the 
collective of Mohammed Yusuf´s followers by the neighbors of their first mosque, the Ibn Taimiyya Mosque 
in Maiduguri, and can loosely be translated from Hausa to English as ‘Western education is forbidden’. The 
name gained traction amongst the Islamic community in northern Nigeria and in the southern-based media as 
the group´s reputation grew. For the northern-based Islamic community it represents an eccentricity that 
conveniently hides the link between the established Islamic organization and the group. The group’s first 
official name Ahl al-Sunna li’l-Da’wa wa’l-Jihad ‘ala Minhaj al-Salaf, directly links the group to the well-
established Islamic movement Alhus Sunna. For the southern-based media the name encompasses common 
islamophobic perceptions of irrationality, ferocity, and backwardness.85 This name has however not been 
officially adopted by the group and a limited reductionist approach to it (deriving the group’s antagonism to 
the western education from the name) has been refused by Sanni Umaru, the first man to proclaim leadership 
of the group following the death of Mohammed Yusuf in 2009. He states:  
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“Boko Haram actually means Western Civilisation is forbidden. The difference is that while 
the first gives the impression that we are opposed to formal education coming from the West, 
that is Europe, which is not true, the second affirms our belief in the supremacy of Islamic 
culture (not education), for culture is broader, it includes education but is not determined by 
Western Education.”86 
It becomes evident from the timeline below that various factions of the main group have broken off at and 
the group has only functioned as a coherent and cohesive unit in short intervals. Factionalism has been a 
constant for the group, a dimension that can be concealed by the use of just one name.87 This thesis uses 
“Boko Haram” but in doing so acknowledges that the name denotes a broader group only loosely organized 
under the umbrella term.     
3.2-Timeline: Boko Haram 
 
Many accounts and reflections pinpoint Boko Haram´s insurgency to June 2009 when fighting between 
followers and security forces took place in the state capitals of Borno, Bauchi, Yoba and Kano. In order to 
examine the causes of the insurgency and gain a more comprehensive picture of the group, this thesis 
identifies three significant events: the murder of Mohammed Yusuf’s mentor Shaykh Ja´far Mahmoud Adam 
in April 2007, the violent clashes in 2009, and the jail break in September 2010 that marked the reemergence 
of the group. The following timeline is divided accordingly.    
3.2.1-Before the Murder of Shaykh Ja’far Mahmoud Adam 
 
The initial Boko Haram group can be traced back to the mid-1990s. It functioned as a hisba group (a small 
group from a mosque community enforcing sharia, usually consisting of young men) under the leadership of 
Mallam Lawal at the Alhaji Muhammadu Ndimi mosque in Maiduguri, the capital of Borno State in the 
northeastern corner of Nigeria. The popular Salafist movement Ahlus Sunna was running the mosque (Ahlus 
Sunna’s role is explored further in section 3.6 on religion). Lawal was succeeded by Mohammed Yusuf, 
when Lawal left to further his Islamic education at the University of Medina in Saudi Arabia.88 While 
occupying the position of youth leader, Yusuf toured the region, in and outside Nigeria, propagating his 
radical interpretation of Islam and his anti-establishment stance. His views had significant resonance with 
large segments of the population as it offered draconian punishments to corrupt government officials, and an 
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alternative state system founded in Islam.89 As is common in Nigeria, his preaching is available on 
YouTube90 and was distributed via tapes across the region. By the early 2000s Yusuf was not calling for 
external jihad (as oppose to internal jihad) against the Nigerian state but he did allow for hijra, withdrawal 
from a society that is perceived as corrupt and heretic. In 2001 Muhammed Alli, another youth leader at the 
Alhaji Ndimi Mosque, led a hijra of several hundred followers to establish an Islamic community in the 
small village of Kanamma, Yobe State.91 Alli’s group became known as the Nigerian Taliban by local media 
because they wrote Taliban on the side of some of their vehicles, called their compound Afghanistan and 
adhered to a radical Salafism.92 The group also managed to run military training camps, kidnap local for use 
as recruits,93 and burn down a police station.94 Violence between civilians, the local authorities and the 
Nigerian Taliban culminated in December 2003, when security forces sieged their compound and killed 
many of the members, including Alli. Survivors returned to join Yusuf at his newly established mosque in 
Maiduguri.95 In 2004 the general group furthermore executed two attacks on police stations. In the first 
incidence, the group managed to kill several policemen, but approximately 27 members were killed. The 
second incidence is more successful as the group kidnapped 12 policemen, and the attempt to trace and catch 
the group failed.96      
While Alli was in Kanamma leading one faction of the broader movement, Yusuf established the Ibn 
Taimiyyah Mosque in Maiduguri. The name signifies adherence to the preaching of Ibn Taimiyyah, a radical 
Salafi theorist living in Damascus during the Mongolian invasion in the late 13th and early 14th century, and 
is a move away from the Saudi inspired Salafism, Wahhabism. Wahhabism was preached by Yusuf’s mentor 
Ja´far Mahmoud and the Alhus Sunna.97 The physical move and the ideological shift away from Alhus 
Sunna, is perhaps the first time the group completely distinguishes itself and is officially established under 
the name Ahl al-Sunna li’l-Da’wa wa’l-Jihad.98 Funds for the group are said to have come from Yusuf’s 
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network in Saudi Arabia, established while on Hajj, and/or come from zakat (portion of a Muslim´s wealth 
obligatorily donated to the poor) paid by businessmen. Both could easily be the case as Yusuf travelled to 
Saudi Arabia on multiple occasions and because he is well known throughout the region around Lake Chad 
by this point in time.99  
In 2004, Boko Haram members were caught smuggling AK-47s across the border into Nigeria.100 In 2005 
Operation Sawdust took place, during which Boko Haram members were arrested, including Yusuf, and 
undefined plans to carry out operations were uncovered. Yusuf was not released until President Umaru Musa 
Yar’Adua took over office from Olusegun Obasanjo in 2007. In this time, a number of security briefs had 
also been submitted to the government of Borno state, the Presidency and the federal Police Headquarter, 
reporting that Yusuf and his groups were manufacturing bombs.101  
The various splits within the Islamic community illustrates the decentralized character of Islam in northern 
Nigeria, and how Islam is constantly used for political ends by the different leaders, and by this is provides a 
platform for competition between the leaders. The group finally situated around the Ibn Taimiyyah Mosque 
was furthermore stocking up arms, underlining Yusuf’s militancy and his expectation of confrontation with 
the government.  
3.2.2-The murder of Shaykh Ja’far Mahmoud Adam 
 
Shaykh Ja’far Mahmoud Adam was a leading Imam of Ahlus Sunna and well-known in the Islamic 
community in northern Nigeria, attracting millions of followers across the north. Yusuf became a 
representative of Ahlus Sunna in Maiduguri around 2000. Due to his preaching founded in radical Salafist 
beliefs, he fell out with the Ahlus Sunna´s leadership and initiated a process of establishing his own mosque 
and accompanying compound. By 2003, a verbal public conflict took place between Ja’far Mahmoud and 
Yusuf. The leadership of Ahlus Sunna critiqued Yusuf’s position against government employment and 
western education. Publicly Yusuf accused Ja’far Mahmoud of being a stooge of the government and ulama 
(Islamic scholar) of the West, and Ja’far Mahmoud in return accused Yusuf and his followers for being 
Kharijites, one of the first known violent Islamic groups.102 While they both adhered to Salafism and its 
provision for creating an Islamic state, they differed on the means of creating the state. Yusuf saw a militant 
path as legitimized by religious provisions and Ja’far Mahmoud argued for cooperation with government on 
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the creation of an Islamic state.103 Leaders within Ahlus Sunna have been forced to leave the organization on 
previous occasions due to their association with funding for militant campaigns, and while the public debate 
between Ja’far Mahmoud and Yusuf concerned interactions with the secular government, their disagreement 
also revolved around the use of funding from abroad.104 The conflict ended abruptly outside Ja’far 
Mahmoud’s mosque in Kano in 2007 when he was gunned down. By now, it’s widely acknowledged that 
Yusuf arranged for the assassination.105 The assassination was distinctly executed: On the 13th of April a 
commando unit shot him with automatic rifles after he led the fajr, the first prayer of the day, at his mosque 
in Kano. In the days leading up to the assassination, Ja’far Mahmoud had received multiple death threats and 
was even sent a burial garment.106 
The split between Ja’far Mahmoud and Yusuf is mainly found outside of doctrine, in their domestic strategy, 
accentuated by the split occurring after the disagreement over international funds and due to their difference 
approach to the Nigerian government. Alli’s earlier hijra is also an example of the divergence of strategy, as 
in doing so he strived to establish an alternative to the Nigerian state, whereas Ja’Far Mahmoud wanted to 
cooperate with the state.   
3.2.3-July: the Month of No Return 
 
From Ja´far Mahmoud´s assassination to the clashes between Boko Haram followers and security forces in 
June 2009, the group was occupied with recruitment and obtaining funds. It is during this period that Boko 
Haram member, Buju Foi, is appointed commissioner of religious affairs in Borno State by State Governor 
Modu Sheriff,107 and that Yusuf is bailed out by his political patrons.108 It is not until June 2009 that the 
group is in the spot light again. While on their way to a funeral on the 11th of June 2009 a few Boko Haram 
members were detained by members of Operation Flush, a state-led security initiative to curb armed 
banditry, for driving without crash helmets. Other members saw this as an intentional provocation, which 
resulted in a shootout between Boko Haram and the authorities where a number of casualties occurred on 
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both sides.109 Yusuf responded by releasing a video statement promising revenge. A wave of revenge attacks 
were initiated on the 26th of July, first against a police station in Bauchi, capital of Bauchi State, and then 
against police and government infrastructure in Borno, Bauchi, Yobe, Gombe Kano Katsina states. Between 
the 26th and the 30th of July more than 800 people were killed by Boko Haram and security forces, including 
at least 30 police officers, and a large number of Boko Haram members and civilians. These attacks ended 
with a large-scale attack on the Ibn Taymiyyah Mosque and its compound.110 Footage from the event clearly 
shows that police assassinated a number of people, including the leader, Yusuf. Police afterwards claimed 
that he was killed trying to escape custody but his handcuffed mutilated body suggests otherwise.111 
Whereabouts of the majority of Yusuf’s followers after his extra-judicial execution are unknown, but some 




The group re-surfaced one year later, first in a video where Shekau calls for revenge against the Nigerian 
police and military,113 later in a prison break in Bauchi freeing around 700 inmates,114 and in a number of 
assassinations of Imams and other public figures speaking out against the group.115 The group has since 
evolved ideologically, tactically and strategically. In 2010, the group was primarily occupied with 
assassinations restricted to the northeast of Nigeria. A significant amount of bank robberies, raids of police 
stations, hospitals and pharmacies followed, along with a large number of bombings. The two most 
significant bombing of this period occurred in Abuja in June and August of 2011 at the national police 
headquarters and the United Nations representation respectively.116,117 While other attacks had occurred in 
Abuja before, the two attacks´ targets and magnitude signify a definitive move beyond the northeastern 
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region, and demonstrates a new scale of violence.  The latter factor is further emphasized by the increased 
use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), and suicide bombs during this period.118 In early 2012, one 
dissident group announced its establishment. Jama’atu Ansaril Muslimina fi Biladis Sudan (Ansaru), 
Vanguard for the Protection of Muslims in Black Africa, can be seen as an international affiliate of Boko 
Haram operating beyond the borders of Nigeria: in Mali, Cameroon and Chad. The faction is closer to the 
other Islamic militant groups in the Sahel, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Movement for 
Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA), and is responsible for a number of kidnappings of foreign 
nationals. Another faction broke off from the main group in July 2011, under the name Yusufiya Islamic 
Movement (YIM) but despite their initial critique of the main Boko Haram group’s civilian victimization, 
they have done little to make themselves noticeable.119 
Boko Haram was able to hold some territory in the Sambisa Forests from 2014 in the far northeastern corner 
of the country, and to attack targets beyond Nigeria, in Cameroon120 and more recently in Chad.121 The 
Nigerian government has responded to the insurgency by allocating more funds to the security sector, 
deploying a large number of troops and fighter jets to the northeastern corner of the country, and by 
declaring a state of emergency in 2013 across three northeastern states of Yobe, Borno, and Adamawa. 
Civilian vigilantes and youth groups have also been given significant leeway in issuing punishment of 
alleged Boko Haram members and affiliates. Armed with rudimentary weapons these groups have conducted 
raids on homes, hacked and tortured suspects to death, and acted as part of investigations by handing alleged 
members over to authorities.122 Despite these measurements casualties have escalated gradually throughout 
the insurgency and by 2014 more than 7.500 have been documented.123   
3.2.5-Observations from the History of Boko Haram  
 
Boko Haram´s first prominent leader Mohammed Yusuf was killed by Nigerian security forces and his death 
increased animosity towards the state amongst his followers. It is impossible to say if Boko Haram would 
have initiated their insurgency had Yusuf not been killed, but it is well-known that they collected weapons 
and prepared for some form of confrontation. The violent approach from the state therefore seems to have 
been counter-productive and provoked an immediate violent response from the group.   
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Yusuf´s death created a martyr. Since his death the group has consistently emphasized this point. While this 
is not a cause of the insurgency, it is important to note for future studies.   
Islam has in Nigeria often been used rhetorically as a tool against corruption, and Yusuf’s anti-establishment 
stance follows this general trend. This topic is explored further in section 3.5 on the Nigerian state as a cause 
of insurgency and 3.6 on religion as a cause of insurgency.  
Leadership struggles are common in Boko Haram and amongst the Islamic community in Nigeria in general. 
Mohammed Alli´s hajri in 2002 effectively created a “new” faction, and Abu Abubakar Shekau and Sanni 
Umaru both claiming leadership following the killing of Mohammed Yusuf illustrate this. The killing of 
Ja’far Mahmoud demonstrates leadership struggles can turn violent. As evident from the section on religion, 
leadership struggles and decentralization are trademarks of Islam organizations in Nigeria.   
Boko Haram is not a coherent and cohesive group with a central leader; instead it should be understood as a 
patchwork of smaller factions operation under one umbrella organization.124 This point is important for the 
genesis of the group as it is impossible to trace an evolution of one specific group and then generalize it to 
the entire body of organizations. This approach to understand the dominant causes behind insurgencies in 
Africa is common but as evident in the section on religious organizations in Nigeria (3.6), Boko Haram can 
broadly be seen as a militant radical off-shoot from the movement for the purification of Islam initiated by 
Abubakar Gumi following independence.125 This does not necessarily mean that Boko Haram’s insurgency 
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Figure 2, Source: United Nations Environmental Program, "Lake Chad: almost gone", UNEP, 
2008, <http://www.unep.org/dewa/vitalwater/article116.hml> (retrieved 1 Oct. 2015) 
3.3-Greed-Natural Resources in Nigeria 
 
Oil is the main natural resource in Nigeria and in 2009 it accounted for 95% of foreign exchange earnings 
and 75% of government revenue.126 It is however unevenly geographically distributed, concentrated in the 
Niger Delta in the South South 
geopolitical zone.127 The 
Biafran War and a number of insurgencies took place in this region and oil was an underlying theme for 
both.128 The resource rich environment in the Niger Delta resonates well with the assumption made in 
Chapter 2 on natural resources and insurgency. The North East might potentially be well-endowed with oil 
deposits but exploration is yet to be confirmed, and no other natural resources have been reported in this 
region.129   
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The environment where Boko Haram emerged stands in stark contrast to the oil rich southeast, where 
exploration began decades ago, and to the resource rich environment described in the literature on 
insurgency in Africa. The northeast is a low-resource environment with no lootable natural resource, no 
large-scaled industry and high rates of unemployment. And while the insurgencies in the Niger Delta have 
been able to profit, or at least sustain their insurgency, from oil bunkering130, Boko Haram’s sources of funds 
are relative diversified including, membership fees, zakat, some external funding, and bank robberies.131 
Resource scarcity in the northeast is heavily marked by the degradation of Lake Chad (see figure 2.). The 
lake’s general basin drainage was inhabited by 22 million people in 1991 and had grown to 37 million by 
2006. The lake currently only covers about 5 % of the area it did in 1963. Small scaled conflicts have 
occurred because people depending on the lake for their livelihood followed the receding shores, and found 
themselves in other countries and in other people’s territory who also depended on the lake. Other conflicts 
have occurred over the legal rights of irrigation projects, but these conflicts are more often than not due to 
poor water management by the governments involved.132 The southbound expansion of the Sahara has also 
contributed to the increased migration, both rural-urban and rural-rural, but it is especially the degradation of 
Lake Chad that forced people to the cities.133 The environment from which Boko Haram emerged from is 
therefore characterized by a scarcity of resources and dramatic change of the environment; not the resource 
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3.4-Grievances in Nigeria 
 
Upon gaining independence on the 1st of October 1960, Nigeria was a myriad of different ethnic, language, 
and religious groups with a population of roughly 40 million people divided into three states. The groups’ 
common colonial past was consolidated by their combination into one single colonial entity in 1914 by Lord 
Frederick Lugard. The north of the colonial state was dominated by the Hausa-Fulani, the southwest by the 
Yoruba, and the southeast by the Igbo. Each region had some level of coherency often in the form of 
religious affiliation to Islam, Christianity, or traditional African religions, but significant minority groups 
existed within each region. In comparison to other African colonies, each region could numerically have 
formed its own country easily.134 Today Nigeria has a population of around 180 million consisting of about 
350 ethnic groups, and close to 500 languages spread across 1 million square kilometres.135 Group divisions 
in many forms underline Nigeria as a polity and rapid state creation has been a mechanism to prevent 
potential conflicts between these. Consequentially the country currently consists of six geopolitical zones: 
the North West, the North Central, the North East, the South West, the South East and the South (see Figure 
1, page IV), 36 states (and the Federal Capital Territory) and 774 local government areas (LGAs). Religious 
and ethnic affiliation have furthermore been left out of national censuses following controversies of censuses 
carried out in the 1950s and 1960s, and the Biafran War in 1967-1970. This means that it is impossible to 
obtain exact numbers on these population groups.136 The data used below is therefore regionally based. Even 
if reliable data was available on ethnic and religious compositions it might not provide particularly fruitful as 
neither are homogenous groups. Ethnicity can be very fluid in Nigeria as groups can merge with each other, 
create new ethnic identities or claim a sub-group of one ethnicity.137 Islam in Nigeria, and elsewhere, is 
marked by decentralization and a large number of Islamic branches and organizations exist, making it 
inadequate to treat Muslims as one category. The same argument is applicable to the six geopolitical zones. 
While the three Northern zones are predominately Muslim and the three Southern are Christian, each zone 
has enclaves dominated by a regional minority religion.138 This does not make it unproductive to examine 
grievances based on these categories, but conclusions should be drawn with caution.  
All geopolitical zones in Nigeria have some level of social, political or economic grievance, but the North 
East, where the far majority of Boko Haram’s activity takes place and where the epicenter of the group’s 
insurgency is located, is the most deprived geopolitical zone in Nigeria. The North East consists of the states: 
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Bauchi, Gombe, Yobe, Adamawa, Taraba, and Borno, and is along with the North West the poorest zones in 
Nigeria by most socioeconomic measurements: food poverty, absolute poverty, relative poverty, and 
proportion of people living under a dollar a day.139 The North East has the lowest youth literacy, the least 
access to improved drinking water, the least access to improved sanitation, the smallest amount of small and 
medium businesses per 100,000 people, and the lowest percentage of citizens watching television and 
reading the newspaper.140 The North East zone scores lowest on the Human Development Index (HDI) and 
highest on the Human Poverty Index of all regions in Nigeria. In terms of intrastate inequality the region 
scores 0.42, which is close to the national average of 0.44.141 The literature on insurgency in Africa suggests 
that scoring low on socioeconomic measurements reduces the cost of recruitment and thereby increases the 
risk of insurgency, but the most significant factor suggested by the literature is political marginalization.  
Political marginalization in Nigeria is an important and complex issue because the federal state is the main 
distributor of goods and most non-oil producing states´ revenue is heavily reliant on this allocation. 
Throughout Nigeria´s political dispensation, the North West has been the best represented geopolitical zone 
in the executive council, and the northern zones have combined provided nine heads of the executive in 
comparison to the four by the southern zones. The leadership of the legislative and the armed forces is also 
historically dominated by the northern zones, while southern zones have been better represented in the 
judiciary, and in the civil services.142 The North East has however only produced one Prime Minister, 
Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, who was assassinated in 1966, and one Chief Justice.143 This underlines that a 
North-South dichotomy hides the disparities within the two regions, as the North West is far better politically 
represented than the North East. A closer look reveals that the North West’s political representation does not 
translate into better socioeconomic conditions for the population living in the zone.    
The North East is currently politically marginalized compared to the North West and the southern zones, 
despite numerous formal and informal mechanisms implemented to avoid marginalization of any specific 
group. Many of the mechanisms have, however, relied on balancing the North-South rivalry, not the North-
North rivalry.144 The large budgets administrated by the individual states and the first-past-the-post electoral 
system practiced in the state governor election, have both contributed to the intense and often violent 
political competition on a state level. While the mechanism focused on balancing the north-south rivalry 
have marginalized individual regions in the north, the first-past-the-post system in gubernatorial election 
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have marginalized smaller groups on a state level.145 Despite the mechanisms put in place to avoid 
marginalization, political domination and marginalization still take place. The political system in Nigeria is 
explored further in the section 3.5 on the Nigerian state as a cause of insurgency.        
Boko Haram’s regional context provided above stresses that the North East is marginalized politically and 
socioeconomically. The literature on insurgency in Africa suggests that these two variables increase the risk 
of insurgency as the political elites have incentive to mobilize the masses, who are cheaply recruited to the 
insurgency. This helps explain the geographical location of Boko Haram in the North East geopolitical 
zones. As with all assumptions on people perceptions based on observable statistics, this does not adequately 
account for peoples´ perceptions, but it does provide a foundation for the assumption that recruitment is 
cheap.  
The poverty levels mentioned in the above do not however reflect the economic decline in the Northeast. As 
a result of the oil boom and the SAPs implemented in Nigeria, the cotton and the agricultural industry 
declined significantly across the northern states. The oil boom and the SAPs caused an overvaluation of the 
Nigerian currency, and made export of labor intensive products and foreign investment unfavorable, meaning 
that new industries, or the reemergence of old ones, have not occurred in northern Nigeria. This has caused a 
migration of low-skilled manpower to urban areas, which has put additional pressure on an already burdened 
job market.146 Interestingly enough, socially reinforcing cleavages are present on a national level and in some 
states but limited in the North East as the low socioeconomic levels cut across most identity-based groups.147 
As mentioned in the previous section on greed and natural resources in Nigeria, the oil discoveries under 
Lake Chad did not occur until 2012 and as Boko Haram’s insurgency began before that, there is little 
evidence supporting that the population should be aggrieved by the lack of profit from the natural resources, 
which increases the risk of insurgency as suggested in the previous chapter. Similar to the conclusion made 
in the previous section on greed and natural resources, the environment where Boko Haram is located is 
marked by increased scarcity of resources in various forms; economic, natural, or social. The literature on 
grievance as a cause of insurgency in Africa reflects this, and the environment where Boko Haram initiated 
their insurgency is typical.  
As mentioned in the introduction, the literature on the causes of Boko Haram’s insurgency is heavily 
dominated by explanations pointing out the poor socio-economic conditions of the North East. But while the 
region is relatively deprived, insurgencies have occurred across Nigeria´s territory. The Movement for the 
Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), the Movement of the Emancipation of the Niger 
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Delta (MEMD) groups, the Oodua People’s Congress (OPC), the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni 
People (MOSOP), and the Niger Delta Vigilante in 1966 are all violent reactions to some level and form of 
grievance.148 The Maitatsine Movement, the Nigerian Muslim Brotherhood led by Sheikh Ibrahim El-
Zackzaky, and the Dan Kaleri groups are all examples of violent groups specific to northern Nigeria, and 
Alao records at least twelve violent radical Islamic groups in Northern Nigeria.149  
The dependent variable, insurgency, is present in many geopolitical zones of Nigeria, exemplified by the 
sheer number of insurgencies spread across Nigeria. Many geopolitical zones therefore provide fertile 
ground for insurgency and it is difficult to conclude that the North East is particularly prone to insurgency 
due the high level of objective regional grievance. Boko Haram’s appeal is furthermore relatively limited and 
does not represent a secessionist struggle of the North East or a broader based specific grievance from a 
neglected region or people. This has more so been the case with the MASSOB and the OPC.150 Instead it 
seems that Boko Haram is able to recruit relatively cheaply because of the lack of job opportunities and the 
general level of poverty across social classes, which essentially repeats Fearon and Laitin points that what 
matters is that “economic opportunities are so poor that the life of a rebel is attractive to 500 or 2,000 young 
men.”151 There is little evidence in the Nigerian context to support the prominent assumption that insurgency 
occurs in regions experiencing relative grievance, simply because it is not possible to isolate the dependent 
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The ethnic dimension of Boko Haram is rarely addressed by the group or reflected in the literature on Boko 
Haram. The literature on causes of insurgency in Africa suggests that ethnic labels will usually play a role in 
politics, and by extension conflict, if they become political labels or political identities, allowing access to 
state resources and political goods, or if they are viable platform to mobilize for elections. There are more 
than 350 ethnic groups in Nigeria, but the big three groups in Nigeria constitute more than half of the 
population: the Hausa/Fulani accounts for around 30%, and the Yoruba and the Igbo for around 20% each, 
with the Yoruba being slightly larger. The smaller but still significant groups are the Ijaw with around 10% 
of the population, the Kanuri and the Lbibio with about 4% each and the Tiv with about 3%.152 The three big 
groups are closely associated with the initial three administrative regions of Nigeria (the North, the West and 
the East) and in the first federal election in 1959 each group established their own geographically rooted 
political party.153 Throughout Nigeria´s history, political parties have been affiliated with the three main 
ethnic groups and smaller ethnic groups have often either been “swallowed” in election or affiliated with one 
the three main groups due to the first-past-the-poll electoral system.154 As mentioned in previous chapter’s 
section on ethnicity, the viability of an ethnic label as a political platform can decided how significant that 
ethnic label will be in political conflict. The Kanuris, the ethnic group most represented in the membership of 
Boko Haram,155 is nationally a minority group, so if a political party began to specifically mobilize the 
Kanuri it would exclude other ethnic groups and the Kanuri can therefore not provide a viable electoral 
platform. A number of provisions have furthermore been inscribed in law to avoid ethnic mobilization. The 
provisions do not mean that ethnicity does not play a role in politics, but it does mean that political parties 
are required to be nationally representative and often build broader ethnic support bases.156 The Kanuri 
ethnic identity has therefore not become a political identity as nationally significant as the three mayor ethnic 
groups, or the Hutu and Tutsi in Rwanda mentioned in the previous chapter. Instead the Kanuri, and many 
other smaller ethnic groups, were united with the Hausa/Fulani under a pan-Islam ideology of “One North, 
One People, Under One God” as the Northern People’s Congress (NPC) expressed it. On a subnational level, 
and especially in the creation of states, smaller ethnic groups play a larger role, even creating new subethnic 
groups and opting in and out of one of the main ethnic groups when deemed beneficial.157 The usual 
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assumption that Nigeria is divided into a dichotic North-South therefore makes sense if the focus is national, 
the presidential election for example, but to understand the state-level dynamics it is inherent to look at  the 
smaller ethnic groups. Nigeria follows the trend of ethnicity and political mobilization presented in the 
previous chapter, by the three most significant ethnic identities also being the three most viable political 
identities nationally and furthermore also being the ethnic label emphasized by the colonial administration.158  
While the Kanuri ethnic group constitutes the majority of Boko Haram’s membership, other ethnic groups 
are also represented.159 Ethnic labels have caused internal divisions within Boko Haram,160 but exact figures 
on the ethnic composition are unknown. As a cause of Boko Haram’s insurgency it is therefore the absence 
of ethnic rhetoric that is interesting. By its absence it can be assumed that ethnicity is simply not a viable 
platform to base an insurgency on and instead Boko Haram has articulated a religious identity. The Islamic 
identity provides Boko Haram with broader reach, beyond the region inhabited by the Kanuri. A Muslim 
identity will add legitimacy to the group just as it has done for other groups, both violent and non-violent, 
with a legitimate identity label to compete for state resources. This aspect is explored in further detail in the 
section on religion (3.6). Islam provides Boko Haram with a legitimate foundation to enter the political 
competition from. Boko Haram does, in this sense, fit rather neatly with the general assumptions on ethnicity 
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3.5-The Nigerian State  
 
Nigeria has always been a divided society. The main lines of division are ethnic, regional, and religious. 
Each of these have been significant for different issues, at different points in time, and on different levels 
(federal and state), sometimes overlapping and sometimes not. Different colonial educational polices 
implemented in the regions before independence meant that southerners dominated the colonial 
administration as civil servants and all institutions of higher learning. When the first joint legislative council 
meeting between the North and the South was held in 1947, the North had one university graduate, five 
newspapers and had only just begun to organize in political parties. The South had several hundred 
university graduates, 35 newspapers, and had contested in elections in both Calabar and Lagos since 1922. 
So while the North was numerically superior, they were underrepresented in the state bureaucracy and in 
general underprepared for independence. The existence of three states at independence each with their own 
dominate ethnic group, furthermore meant that smaller entities, political parties, religious, and ethnic groups 
would often be either “swallowed” by one of the larger entities by affiliation or plainly left out of decision 
making. 161 While each state could easily have formed their own country by numerical standards,162 they were 
now pooled together in the constellation of Nigeria, where both federal and state contradictions with a 
potential for conflicts were abundant. Within a decade of independence the country had experienced two 
military led coups and a civil war that cost between 1 and 3 million lives, and turned additional 3 million into 
displaced persons.163  
On a federal level, conflicts have revolved around federal revenue distributions, distribution of power 
between ethnic, regional and religious groups, and civil-military relations. With the introduction of 
democracy in 1999, the latter has been of little immediate concern but still lingers in the back of Nigeria’s 
national consciousness. Revenue distribution is a contentious issue and approximately 75% of total 
government revenue is reliant on oil and gas,164 which is located in just a few states. It can be argued that the 
majority of these challenges are founded in Nigeria’s large size, which have caused endless refinements to 
the federation formula, including the creation of new states currently at 36 with a total of 774 Local 
Government Areas (LGAs), that presidential candidates must win at least 25% of the votes in two-thirds of 
states, all significant ethnic groups need to be represented in the civil service, and oil revenue is distributed 
by the federal government but the local government and states have significant autonomy over it allocation 
within the state budget. The latter factor has two significant consequences. The number of states and their 
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heavy reliance on the distribution, often without much federal oversight, of oil and gas revenue means that 
states no longer require economic viability. The further existence of approximately 350 ethnic groups and a 
tendency to create new sub-ethnic groups to advance specific interest results in a constant potential for a 
creation of states. The second consequence of decentralized oil and gas revenue is that corruption in the 
individual states has increased immensely.165 
 
This section starts by identifying the specific weaknesses of the Nigerian state with significant relevance for 
Boko Haram, in particular the lack of a monopoly of violence. It secondly introduces the political behavior in 
Nigeria, more specifically the high level of corruption, violence and disregard for democratic principles often 
labeled godfatherism. It then introduces two specific events in recent Nigerian history that have impacted the 
weakness of the security sector, increased the political competition and increased the politico-religious 
competition. These two are democratization and the introduction of Sharia law across most of the northern 
states.    
3.6.1-Nigeria: a Failed State? 
 
It has been argued that Nigeria was a failed state,166 but perhaps the country is currently better understood as 
a collapsing state167 or a weak state with a potential for disintegration but also a potential to redeemed itself 
and move towards a higher level of stability with stronger institutions. One of the Nigerian state´s main 
weaknesses is closely linked to Boko Haram´s insurgency. The lack of a monopoly of violence and 
ineffective projection of power has left certain rural corners of Nigeria outside the state’s jurisdiction.  
Boko Haram initiated their insurgency in the northeastern states, where population density is the lowest in 
the country168 and furthest from the capital.169 The Nigerian police force is furthermore notoriously corrupt, 
brutal, and under-resourced, demonstrated by the ample examples of arbitrary killings, roadblocks 
established for bribes, requirements of bribes prior to investigation etc.170 In the early 2000s, the Nigerian 
Taliban conducted hijra and were largely left alone, able to conduct military training in Yobe state. After the 
police’s initial clampdown on the group in December 2003, the majority was killed but a significant number 
of the members escaped and rejoined Yusuf’s group in Maiduguri. In 2004, it was possible for the group to 
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kidnap and execute several policemen without being caught.171 After the Maiduguri crackdown by security 
forces in July 2009 the surviving members of the group were able to escape and hide not just in Nigeria, but 
also beyond the border in Cameroon.172 Even though Yusuf was arrested and held in police custody on at 
least three occasions, he was always released on bail eventually.173 That a large number of Boko Haram 
members have been arrested on numerous occasions only to be released, points to a general climate of 
impunity caused by bad policing and an inadequate judiciary. In this sense it is not a case of Boko Haram’s 
excellent ability to operate without being caught by facilitating the vast and sparsely populated North East to 
their advantages, but a case of a well-known group’s members facing arrests and still being able to carry on 
their mission.174 Large numbers of in-depth news articles are publicly available at this point indicating that 
information about the group is available, further highlighting the weakness of the security forces.175  
It is not just the security forces’ inertia that illustrates their inadequacy but also their harshness. The 
December 2003 siege of the group’s compound in Kanamma ended with the death of most of the participants 
in hijra, and the July 2009 clashes between security forces and the group in the streets of capital cities of the 
North East left more than 800 casualties (civilians, police and members included).176 Responses to the group 
by the government have either been close to absent or too harsh, killing and injuring innocent people in the 
process. As the full scale insurgency began in mid-2010 the branches of the security sector mostly concerned 
with the insurgency, police, military, and the civilian Joint Task Force (JTF), have all applied exceedingly 
heavy-handed methods increasing the death tolls by thousands over the years.177 When the security forces did 
not apply harsh methods, they were inadequately equipped to carry the task, often running out of 
ammunition, deployed without ammunition altogether, or plainly overrun by Boko Haram.178 
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The North East borders Niger, Cameroon and Chad. These borders are porous with long stretches of 
uncontrolled areas making border crossing of people, contraband, and vehicles relatively easy and often 
unseen.179 As pointed out by Pérouse de Montclos weapons have been widely available in the region around 
Lake Chad since the end of Chad’s civil war in the 1980s.180 The under-capacitated security forces are 
thereby unable to protect and patrol the country’s borders.    
The northern eastern corner of Nigeria is desert-like, vast and sparsely populated, where groups can act with 
a high level of impunity, the local population has little incentive to cooperate with a violent and corrupt 
police force, insurgents can escape across the porous borders, and weapons and skilled manpower is easily 
obtainable. All of these factors point towards multiple inadequacies of the security forces and the lack of the 
state’s monopoly of violence, which has created pockets of ungoverned territory. While it might be tempting 
to understand this as Abuja’s neglect and disregard for a far-off distant corner of its territory, the government 
is trying to bring the area under its control by most means at its disposal, as demonstrated by the troop 
deployment in the region, it simply cannot.181      
The inability to provide security to the population is not Nigeria’s only failure as a state and as pointed out 
by Hill, Nigeria fails to provide sufficient educational services and health care, especially in the rural 
areas.182 The observations made above are very much in line with the literature on the state as a cause of 
insurgency in Africa, by the trend of security forces to either provoke insurgency by harsh responses or 
enable insurgency by allowing for impunity. Interestingly, the fight between Boko Haram and the Nigerian 
state follows Herbst’s general assumptions on COIN in Africa. Intelligence services with limited capacity 
fail to act adequately when faced with an infant insurgency. This has little to do with geographical size as 
even small states face this issue and when an insurgency matures, the military loses their initial advantages 
of pure force because the conflict will be fought by unconventional means. The latter point is multiplied if 
the African state is geographically big in which case the state already has huge budgetary commitments, does 
not receive a lot of donor aid, and can therefore not free funds to sustain an effective COIN campaign across 
large portions of its territory. The military´s initial advantages are furthermore lost as it becomes difficult to 
recruit troops to fight against a full-scale insurgency.183     
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Nigeria did not collapse or disintegrate to the same extent as Sierra Leone, Liberia, the DRC or Somalia. 
Instead the neopatrimonial system of power bargaining mutated into a political logic associated with high 
levels of corruption, violence and intimidation often labelled prebendalism or godfatherism. Prebendalism is 
the appropriation of state offices for private accumulation of wealth for self and for distribution to a network 
of patronage,184 but godfatherism deserves a more in-depth description. The Nigerian state has been used as a 
tool by civilians and military political elites for self-enrichment and to sustain patronage networks. Rooted in 
the colonial period, perfected in the immediate post-independence period, and extended under various 
military governments, the system has been effective in enriching a selective number of people, often the ones 
holding public office.185 After democratization in 1999, political competition began to revolve around 
elections, but as elected officials are usually restricted to serving two terms, the main beneficiaries are often 
behind the scenes. These, mostly men, have been called godfathers, big men, political kingmakers, Maigida 
(master of the house) in Hausa or Baba Kekere (the small great father) in Yoruba. They engage in intense 
and extensive political competition to install their ‘godson’ in public office and get their share of the state 
coffers.186  
Political parties are better understood as election platforms from where the godfathers run their candidates, 
rather than political parties in a more conventional sense with coherent agendas and ideologies. Candidates 
therefore tend to exchange one party for another at their convenience. The level of prebendalism makes 
control over public office an extremely lucrative business, but it also involves a high risk when the 
relationship between the godfather and godson grows sour.187 The godfathers install a politician in office, 
who could not have won by his own means, and expect financial rewards via government contracts, control 
over office appointments, blatant money transfers from the state coffers to private bank accounts etc. in 
return. The politician in office becomes a stooge of the godfather, who rarely has interest in running for 
office himself, or are not allowed to under the two term provision. Former Oyo State governor Victor 
Olunloyo commented that in the Nigerian political system: “Money flows up and down…these honorable 
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members [of the Oyo State House of Assembly], during the election period, they want the patronage of the 
puppeteer. Afterwards money will flow in the opposite direction—back from the puppet to the puppeteer.”188 
The habitual godfather strategy is to constantly increase the godson’s debt by ensuring time in office, but as 
the godfather is often in control of political gangs he can also unleash violence when threatened. One such 
godfather is Lamidi Adedibu, who rose to power because he controlled the Oyo state chapter of the National 
Union of Road Transport Workers (NURTW). His godson Rashidi Ladojal was installed as Oyo State 
governor in 2003, but he quickly refused to pay the demanded kickbacks. In 2005 this resulted in knife 
stabbings in the state house of assembly followed by guns fights in the streets of Ibadan, and eventually 
Ladojal was removed from office. Godfatherism spread throughout Nigeria189 and had come about due to 
high state dependence on re-distribution of oil income, the peripheral influence of state politics in federal 
politics, the lack of accountability, and the lack of alternative sources of income. Altogether it has created a 
system where violence, corruption, and rigged elections orchestrated by godfathers persevere190 and where 
the general public is excluded from political goods in favor of the elite.  
3.6.3-Godfatherism, Gubernatorial and Boko Haram  
 
One of Nigeria’s most notorious godfathers is former Borno State Governor Ali Modu Sheriff and his rise to 
state governor was closely linked to Boko Haram’s insurgency. Modu Sheriff was wealthy and influential 
member of the All Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP). He became the godfather of Mallam Kachlallah during the 
Borno State 1999 gubernatorial election. Kachlallah won the Borno State governorship and Modu Sheriff 
won a seat in the national senate and became the ANPP’s senate leader, significantly increasing his influence 
in the party. Immediately after Kachlallah’s electoral victory he refused Modu Sheriff’s demands of control 
of office appointments and allocation of state funds. But Kachlallah was not Modu Sheriff’s only godson in 
the Borno State Assembly, and he soon faced significant resistance from Modu sheriff’s other clients. Both 
Modu Sheriff and Kachlallah established Ecomog gangs,191 political thugs, which intensified and escalated 
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the violence in Borno. The whole episode ended in the impeachment of Kachlallah and Modu Sheriff taking 
over the state governorship.192 
Modu Sheriff sponsored an Ecomog group during the 2003 gubernatorial election and this is one of the initial 
Boko Haram groups. Modu Sheriff agreed to an implementation of Sharia in Borno closer to the 
interpretation of Mohammed Yusuf in exchange for Yusuf’s group´s aid. There is consensus on the initial 
cooperation between Modu Sheriff and Yusuf, but the circumstances around the fall out between the two are 
debatable. By one account, their cooperation was short lived as Modu Sheriff cut ties to Yusuf after winning 
the election and becoming Borno state governor in 2003, once Yusuf had served his purpose.193 The use of 
political thugs to unleash violence and intimidate voters is common political practice in Nigeria. What seems 
to be the difference in the case of Boko Haram is Modu Sheriff’s underestimation of the popularity and 
capacity of Yusuf and his followers. By other accounts, Modu Sheriff continued to sponsor the group after 
the 2003 gubernatorial election.194 As with many factors in the intricate political scene in Nigeria it is 
difficult to verify what actually happened and continues to happen, but Modu Sheriff was arrested in 
Cameroon in 2012 due to his involvement with the group and he was only released after pressure from 
Cameroonian government officials.195  
One of Modu Sheriff’s claims to innocence is based on Boko Haram killing his brother and cousin and that 
he has personally been a targeted by the group. While the death of his family members is verified, all family 
members who were killed were also politicians, making it hard to estimate the reason for the murders.196 
However, the group has sworn vengeance on the state governor based on his backtracking on stricter state 
implementation of Sharia and due to his involvement in the extra-judicial execution of Yusuf in July 2009. 
Modu Sheriff’s relationship with Yusuf manifested in his appointment of Buju Foi as state commissioner of 
religious affairs in 2007. Foi was a well-known follower of Yusuf when he was appointed197 but was later 
killed together with Yusuf’s brother-in-law Baa Mohammed in the July clashes between authorities and the 
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group.198 It is well-known that Yusuf began to speak out against Modu Sheriff in early 2009, accusing him of 
taghut, referring to anything un-Islamic.199  
The patronage relationship between Modu Sheriff and Yusuf helps to explain the geographical location of 
Boko Haram´s first compound in Maiduguri and why the group could operate very freely in the initial stages. 
It furthermore underlines how youth groups at a mosque can be mobilized to violence and intimidation by 
elites with political ambitions. More important for the academic debate is the dynamics of highly 
personalized politics where individuals have a huge impact on allocations of funds to various groups. 
3.6.5- Democratization  
 
The most important event in Nigeria’s recent history is the transition from military rule to democracy in 
1999. The Nigerian Armed Forces’ interventions have interrupted previous periods of democracy but the 
current period, the Fourth Republic, is now the longest consecutive democratic period. Muhammadu 
Buhari´s 2015 presidential victory furthermore marks the first win by an oppositional candidate. While the 
relatively peaceful handover of power from former President Jonathan Goodluck’s party, The People’s 
Democratic Party (PDP), to Buhari’s All Progressive Congress (APC) indicates some level of democratic 
consolidation, the debate on democracy´s benefits for the population is ongoing. The democratic 
dispensation has had significant consequences. First is the increase of political competition via election. 
Secondly, is the lack of a monopoly on violence, this point is further explored in relation to democratization 
below, and thirdly is the need for politicians to garner popularity. Candidates for state governor in the North 
have done so by promising implementation of Sharia law to curb the rampant corruption. 
3.6.5.1-Democratization and Nigeria’s Weak Security Sector 
 
The existence of Boko Haram and the Movement of the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) 
demonstrate the inability of the democratic Nigerian state to provide security from internal threats. That is, 
the Nigerian state lacks a monopoly on violence within its territory. Hill suggests that this can either be 
explained by the lack of civilian control over the armed forces following the transition from military rule to 
democracy or by the general deterioration of the armed forces’ capacity.200 A number of initiatives have been 
made to ensure civilian control and the non-interference of military into civilian politics, including retirement 
of all military officers who held political office during the military rule years, continuous reorganizations, 
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and general demilitarization.201 Despite, or perhaps because of, these initiatives, a 2008 evaluation of the 
security sector stated that the most crucial weakness of the sector is the security-decision making, and the 
most important weakness of the security-decision making is its ad-hoc nature: “It is not shaped by any 
coherent national security strategy”.202 The lack of a White Paper establishing Nigeria’s security priorities 
are echoed in the budgetary process, which during the last decade of military rule was marked by the absence 
of due process and allocation of funds according to needs. While the general governmental budgetary 
process has re-established some of its legitimacy under the democratic dispensation, the civilian-led Ministry 
of Defence has very little control over military expenditures which are effectively controlled by the service 
commanders within the three divisions of the Nigerian Armed Forces: the army, the navy and the air force.203    
Hill´s second concern, that the military capacity of Nigeria has deteriorated, is substantiated by a report from 
2000 stating that 75% of the Nigerian Army´s equipment was not operational.204 According to Bates, military 
leaders faced with democratization and democratically elected leaders will tap into the state coffers due to 
their limited time in office. The behaviour of both will weaken general state capacity including the security 
sector.205 The assumptions is supported in SIPRI data as there was a significant increase in military spending 
leading up to the introduction of democracy in 1999, followed by the relative stability of the military budget 
until an increased occurred in 2008206, coinciding with Boko Haram initiating their insurgency. The 
weakness of the Armed Forces is amplified by the lack of a coherent strategy, due budgetary process, and 
civilian control. Hill´s two concerns are therefore not mutually exclusive and are both a consequence of 
Nigeria´s long periods of military rule and the democratization process, which has led to specific enclaves of 
the Nigerian territory being ungoverned.   
The impact of democratization on the armed forces has been severe and their weaknesses have in return been 
one of the major causes of Boko Haram’s insurgency. It is therefore interesting that the nexus between 
democratization and security as a cause of Boko Haram’s insurgency is non-existent in the literature on 
causes of Boko Haram’s insurgency.   
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3.6.4.2-Democratization and the Introduction of Sharia Law in Nigeria   
 
Following the re-introduction of democracy in 1999, northern state governor candidates increased their 
popularity in the election by promising implementation of Sharia law in criminal law, and by the end of 2002 
twelve northern states had incorporated some elements of Sharia into their criminal code. Whereas Sharia 
implementation was being presented to the public as a tool to curb rampant corruption, it was more so a 
political tool for state governors to affiliate closer with religious organizations, and increase their public 
support base. Legislation was rushed and contradictory, and insufficient time had gone into capacity building 
of lawyers, judges, and police, all making the actual implementation come across very insincere. This is 
perpetuated by the general level of corruption in the Nigerian judiciary, the wealth of arbitrary sentences 
passed, and the targeting of poor people.207 
In Garza’s study of Sharia Law in the Kano state, he found that virtually no Islamic organizations, ranging 
from conservative brotherhoods to radical Shiites, were opposed to the initial implementation.208 It’s 
important to note that the more radical element of the Islamic community challenged the established Islamic 
orders’ authority to provide guidance in the Sharia courts by pointing to scripture. The continuous call for 
closer adherence to scripture, means that organizations are competing with each other for who were would be 
deemed closer to a real Islam. Religious authenticity became a political issue and both religiously and 
politically it became impossible to argue against Sharia implementation. The largest discussion for the 
Islamic community was however not of scripture, but who should pass judgements and who should enforce 
Sharia.209 Police in Nigeria is Federal but Sharia law is state specific, so Sharia states ended up using hisba 
groups as law enforcers. Hisba groups can be understood as small groups, often formed by youth groups 
associated with a specific mosque. These groups were tasked with enforcing Sharia law by either handing 
over suspects to the Sharia courts or by delivering immediate punishment.210 Being able to act with a high 
degree of impunity is effectively providing the hisba groups a significant amount of power to exercise their 
own interpretation of Sharia and to carry out personal acts of revenge. Sharia is particularly interesting for 
Boko Haram, as the group was initially one of the hisba groups and because Modu Sheriff promised stricter 
Sharia implementation in Borno State in exchange for support from the group.211 After being elected, Sheriff 
created a state ministry of religious affairs and put a close confidante of Yusuf in charge of it212 but like most 
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other state governors promising stricter sharia, Modu Sheriff did not care much about divine justice after 
being elected.213  
Apart from the frustration caused by Modu Sheriff’s backtracking on implementation, the failure of the 
Sharia already implemented was also a cause of concern. Any arrests made by the hisba groups can be 
overruled by the state police, and both the federal government court and the individual states’ chief justice 
administrator is allowed to dismiss Sharia judgements.214 Hisba groups were furthermore often used as tools 
by the state governor to intimidate political opposition and they only arrested the poorest segment of the 
population. The Sharia implementation caused conflict between various Islamic groups, as leaders would 
agree to integrate into the court system as a way to gain political power and receive economic benefits.215 As 
Yusuf’s group was eventually excluded from the Sharia courts, it lost significant political influence.  The 
issues of Sharia implementation should therefore be understood as intensifying the political competition 
between the different Islamic groups in the north.  
While the introduction of Sharia is exclusive to northern Nigeria, the use of parallel law enforcement bodies 
is not. The Bakassi Boys, the MASSOB and the OPC were hired by various state governors to enforce laws, 
or to act as the state governors’ private militia, by extra-judicial means including cutting off hands and arms. 
They were furthermore used as muscle in fights between politicians. Like the hisba groups, these were 
wrapped in anti-corruption rhetoric but used for political intimidation.216  
Implementation of Sharia has on many occasions been used as tool for curbing corruption, rhetorically, and it 
was often enforced by the hisba groups linked to local mosques. For religious and political leaders Sharia 
implementation is a way to achieve secular ends by religious means. The decentralized structure of Islam 
allows for this and combined with Nigerian politics, it can often turn violent.         
3.6.5- Findings: The Nigerian State as Cause for Boko Haram’s Insurgency 
 
The overriding theme in Nigeria’s recent history is democratization. In the academic literature on the state as 
a cause of insurgency, democratization has two sides. Firstly, rulers faced with democratization will 
increasingly use the state’s institutions for accumulation of wealth as they are faced with a time restriction on 
access to the state, and that democratic leaders will behave in the same way due to the potential defeat in 
election. This behavior causes state weakness. Secondly, democratization increases political competition in 
                                                          
213 J. Harnischfeger, “Boko Haram And Its Muslim Critics: Observations From Yobe State”, (2014). 
214 Paul M. Lubeck, “Nigeria: Mapping the Shari`a Restorationist Movement” in Robert Hefner (ed.), Shari`a 
Politics: Islamic Law and Society in the Modern World, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2011):244-279. 
215 Johannes Harnischfeger, Democratization and Islamic Law: The Sharia Conflict in Nigeria, (Frankfurth/New York: 
Campus Verlag, 2008). 
216 W. Reno. “The Politics of Insurgency in Collapsing States”, (2002):837-858. 
49 
 
general, especially in the period leading up to elections. Both consequences of democratization are 
experienced in Nigeria.  
3.6.5.1-State Weakness 
 
The Nigerian state’s institutions are weak because of the continuous plunder of its coffers, especially in the 
decade leading up to the introduction of democracy in 1999 but also during the democratic period. This have 
effectively caused weakness of the Nigerian Armed Forces and the police service, the two main institutions 
tasked with preventing a potential insurgency from escalating and with defeating an occurring insurgency.    
Plundering of the state’s institutions is not the only factor causing weakness of Nigeria’s security sector. The 
lack of civilian control over the armed forces and the lack of a coherent strategy further deepen the 
institutional weakness. This is the reverberations of decades of military rule, where rulers were neither 
financially nor politically accountable.  
Nigeria’s weak security sector has allowed for Boko Haram to emerge within a geographical enclave of little 
or no government provided security. It was initially the inability of the police force to act accordingly 
towards a brewing insurgency, which provided opportunity for Boko Haram to train, recruit and execute 
small scale attacks. When the police responded to the small insurgency, its actions were so harsh that it 
provoked Boko Haram to stockpile arms and await another attack. This attack came in July 2009, and in 
Maiduguri alone it left more than 800 Boko Haram members and civilians dead. Facilitating the uncontrolled 
borders to escape the country and the little presence of police in the immediate region surrounding 
Maiduguri, Boko Haram was able to reorganize and initiate a full scale insurgency a year later. The low 
capacity of Nigeria armed forces meant that they were able to do so and even grow throughout the process. 
Government presence exists on a spectrum and while Boko Haram’s environment is not ungoverned to the 
extent of the Kivus in the DRC, it still provides a low enough presence of security to allow for insurgencies 
to develop.   
3.6.5.2-Political Competition 
 
Prebendalism is prevalent in Nigeria, but godfathers have effectively found a way to circumvent the time 
constraint on access to state resources associated with democracy. By placing a stooge, or godson, in public 
office, they are still able to appropriate the state’s wealth for private accumulation. Godfatherism is a 
consequence of the intensified political competition which followed the democratic dispensation. Modu 
Sheriff is a good example of a godfather who applied violence through his political thugs, the initial Boko 
Haram group, to obtain his political and financial goals. The huge of amount of oil revenue distributed by the 
federal government to the states without much oversight have increased the stakes by making access to state 
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funds more lucrative. This has in returned multiplied the level of intensity of the political competition. The 
literature on causes of insurgency in Africa does not include this innovative method of appropriating state 
funds, and the initial development of Boko Haram illustrates the link between democratization, violent and 
intense political competition, and insurgency. 
Another factor of democratization is Sharia implementation. The debate on Sharia implementation has been a 
constant throughout Nigeria’s history, but it was not until the introduction of democracy in 1999 that civilian 
politicians could facilitate Sharia’s popularity to win elections. Modu Sheriff promised stricter Sharia 
implementation to the initial Boko Haram group, the hisba group, and he could in return use the group as 
political thugs, or parochial rebels as labeled by Reno.217 The violence and intimidation provided by Boko 
Haram helped Modu Sheriff to win the election. Activation of religious instruments, Sharia, for political ends 
explains why Boko Haram developed from a Hisba group following democratization. But groups of political 
thugs exist throughout Nigeria based on from different organizations: labor unions, youth wings of political 
parties etc.218 and it is essentially the violent, highly personalized and deeply corrupt nature of Nigerian 
politics that causes such groups to emerge. Sharia implementation instead provided an entry for religious 
group into politics. Democratization in the Nigeria did not alone increased competition between more 
conventional political entities (political parties, unions etc.) but also expanded the political competition to 
include religious organization. Nigeria therefore provides a good example of democratization’s impact in 











                                                          







In Nigeria it is not only politicians, political parties and the military, who played a significant role in shaping 
the current political dynamics, the various religious communities and organizations have interacted with the 
political arena throughout Nigeria’s history, at times very blatantly and other times subtly. In the North it is 
specifically the Islamic organizations, which have been in conflict with each other. Nigeria is a microcosm of 
the religious composition of the rest of Africa, as roughly 50% are Muslim, 40% are Christian and 10% 
adheres to traditional African religions.219 The southern parts are largely Christian, the northern are largely 
Muslim, and African Traditional Religions are usually practiced syncretic, in particular in the middle belt. 
But just as the ethnic landscape is not binary neither is the religious and many small enclaves of Muslims 
exist in the south as well as Christian enclaves in the north. Neither Islam nor Christianity are uniform 
categories and a wealth of different Christian and Muslim denominations exist.220 John Campbell, the former 
US ambassador to Nigeria and author on Nigeria,221 points out that Islam in the north is often practiced 
differently than in the South. Islam in the South is a choice and families can consist of both Muslims and 
Christians. They will usually celebrate each other’s holidays and in general have a relaxed relationship to the 
choice of religion. In the North, what Campbell calls emirate Islam is practiced, meaning an Islam deeply 
embedded in sociopolitical patterns and tied to political institutions. Islam is not an individual choice but a 
religion you are born into and apostasy is almost unthinkable.222 “Emirate Islam” is entrenched in the history 
of Islam in the North. Islamic empires and caliphates existed far before the British colonial administration’s 
designation of the region as the Northern Nigeria Protectorate in 1900, and the colonial administration relied 
heavily on the caliphates even after Lord Frederick Lugard became governor and established the Colony and 
Protectorate of Nigeria by merging the North and the South in 1914.223 Islamic institutions have a long 
history of political administration in the north, and their various conflicts are an important feature of the 
political environment in Nigeria.  
 
 
                                                          
219 The World Fact Book, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ni.html> (retrieved 16 
July 2015,) 
220 A. Alao, “Islamic radicalisation and violent extremism in Nigeria,”(2013):127-147 
221 See Nigeria: Dancing on the Brink, (United Kingdom: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2011).  
222 John Campbell, ”Five Questions on...Religion in Nigeria”, Tony Blair Faith Foundation, 8 July 
2014,<http://tonyblairfaithfoundation.org/religion-geopolitics/commentaries/backgrounder/five-questions-onreligion-
nigeria> (retrieved 1 Aug. 2015)    
223 Roman Loimeier, “Islamic Reform and Political Change: The Example of Abubakar Gumi and the 'Yan Izala 
Movement in Northern Nigeria”, in: David Westerlund (ed.), African Islam and Islam in Africa. Encounters between 
Sufis and Islamists, (London: C. Hurst and Co. Publishers Ltd, 1997):286-307. 
52 
 
3.5.1-Boko Haram and Salafism  
 
Even though Boko Haram has not openly adhered to Salafism, their rhetoric and some of their behavior are 
closely linked to this branch of Islam. Rhetorically, Mohammed Yusuf proscribed what has been labeled as 
ultra-Salafism and his sermons were widely available via audio cassettes, videos and books distributed 
throughout the region, and his sermons were well attended.224 One of the more concrete linkages between 
Boko Haram and Salafism is the name of their first mosque in Maiduguri, the Ibn Taymiyyah Mosque. 
Taymiyyah lived in Damascus in 14th century during the Mongolian invasion and is associated with Salafism 
due to his call for a more literal interpretation of Islam and his occupation with external Jihad.225 By ‘Salafi’ 
having a connotation of Islamic authenticity and legitimacy, most Muslims will to some extent identify as a 
Salafi but not with the organizations often labeled Salafist by the west. It is therefore important to underline 
that Salafism is not an undebated term understood equivalently by all Muslims but more so a term used 
mostly by Western scholars to frame specific groups. The main tenet of Salafism is authenticity: Islam 
should be practiced like the followers closest to the Prophet. This is achieved by literal and strict 
interpretation of the religious texts, and a rejection of everything bid’a, religious innovation, and taghut, 
idolatry. Bid’a can refer to manmade logic or western logic, and other Islamic denominations especially the 
more mystically inclined Sufi brotherhood. Taghut is the theological reason for Ansar Dine’s destruction of 
shrines in Timbuktu226 and behind Taliban’s bombing of the Buddha of Bamiyaan in Afghanistan.227 This 
logic is evident in Yusuf’s interview with the BBC: "Like rain. We believe it is a creation of God rather than 
an evaporation caused by the sun that condenses and becomes rain.,” or in him saying that "like saying the 
world is a sphere. If it runs contrary to the teachings of Allah, we reject it. We also reject the theory of 
Darwinism."228 And while the group itself has adopted numerous names, it was this kind of logic that made 
the neighbors of the Ibn Taymiyyah Mosque in Maiduguri name Yusuf’s group Boko Haram,229 or as often 
translated from Hausa to English: ‘Western education is forbidden.’230  
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3.5.2-Salafism and the Islamic Community in Northern Nigeria  
 
Violent and non-violent Salafis have existed in Nigeria since independence, so it is important to note that 
these groups are largely in doctrinal agreement but strategic disagreement. Some groups are purist, who do 
not interact with politics but are strictly concerned with theological questions. Other can be described as 
politico and they interact non-violently with the political arena in order to change society according to 
Salafist doctrine. The last group is the jihadists who adopt a violent strategy in order to submerge society in 
the doctrine of Salafism.231 Boko Haram falls into the latter category. They are occupied with Takfirism. 
Takfir is an un-Islamic individual and therefore a legitimate target. For Boko Haram, everybody who do not 
adhere to their strict interpretation of Islam is takfir and can be killed legitimately. Takfirism furthermore call 
on its followers to go on hijra, implying settlement in isolated societies from where kafirs, infidels, should be 
fought.232 Mohammed Alli’s hijra to Kanamma in 2001 followed this idea and so does Boko Haram’s Islamic 
state in the Sambisa Forest in 2014. The attacks on civilians not adhering to the strict, and selective, 
interpretation of Salafism are also to some degree legitimized by the occupation with bid’a and Takfirism. 
While it is important to acknowledge these dynamics, neither Salafism nor Takfirism is the dominate cause 
of Boko Haram’s insurgency but its inherent logic is in constant confrontation with the lived reality of 
Nigerians.  
3.5.3-Boko Haram and the Islamic Community 
 
Northern Nigeria has experienced significant struggles between various Islamic organizations, and between 
Islamic organizations and the political rulers. Religious scholar Abubakar Gumi use Salafism as a nationalist 
or regionalist rallying cry for independence, and he can largely be credited for Salafism popularity in 
northern Nigeria. He established Jama ‘atu Izalat al-Bid’a wa Iqamat al-Sunna, Society of Removal of 
Innovation and Reestablishment of the Sunna, (Yan Izala) in 1978. Yan Izala became a vehicle for political 
organization and mobilization for political conscious people, attracting young middle-class professionals 
with modern education as Salafism was a form of rebellion against the failed establishment based on 
Western ideas.233 Uncontrolled urbanization, the materialism accompanying the 1970s oil boom, government 
corruption, and high unemployment of especially students from the madrasa allowed for all religious 
organizations to promulgate their alternative to the current political system. Christian sects, Sufis, Sunnis and 
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following the 1979 Iranian revolution also Shias, were all present in the congested religious environment in 
northern Nigeria.234       
The lack of job opportunity, the highly decentralized hierarchy, corruption charges against the leadership, the 
death of Gumi in 1992, and a blackened public reputation caused factionalism.235 By early 1990s Alhus 
Sunna was formed in Maiduguri and Shayk Ja’far Mahmoud Adam was one of its leaders.236 Mohammed 
Yusuf was a representative of Ahlus Sunna in Maiduguri around 2000. Like Ja’far Mahmoud, Yusuf can at 
this time be labeled a politico Salafist as they are non-violently engaged in the political arena. Ja’far 
Mahmoud was however more tolerant of cooperation with government whereas Yusuf soon began to preach 
complete disregard for government, including a prohibition on government employment for members and a 
stricter implementation of Sharia. His radical preaching and anti-government stance brought him into disdain 
amongst the leadership of Ahlus Sunna so he established his own mosque, the Ibn Taymiyyah Mosque, and 
accompanying compound. Ja’far Mahmoud accused Yusuf and his followers for being Kharijites, the first 
Islamic group to display violent extremist behavior,237 and Yusuf accused Ja’far Mahmoud of being a stooge 
of the government and ulama of the West. It is however not until Ja’far Mahmoud and Mohamed Yusuf 
disagreed over funding from the London-based al-Muntada aid organizations, that Ja’far Mahmoud is 
assassinated outside his Kano mosque in 2007.238 In Brigaglia’s opinion, Ja’far Mahmoud was both aware of 
the funding and the military training camps in Nigeria, but was under the impression that the recruits would 
leave Nigeria to fight in a legitimate jihad elsewhere.239  
3.5.6-Findings: Religion as a Cause of Boko Haram’s Insurgency  
 
Reaching secular and political ends by religious means is common practice in northern Nigeria, and the 
intense competition between religious organizations with the interference of political organizations has been 
a dominant cause of conflict and in some cases, insurgency. Boko Haram is in this light a militant radical 
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offshoot of Gumi’s Islamic purification initiative. The sheer amount of people organized in the religious 
organizations makes it inherently lucrative for politicians to cooperate with religious leaders, but the 
decentralized nature of Islam in northern Nigeria means that cooperating with one excludes cooperating with 
the other, which increases the competition. Sharia became a topic of conflict because it increases the legal 
jurisdiction of religious Islamic leaders, but when the implementation is disregarded after electoral victory it 
causes conflict between politicians and the religious leaders. This was one of the more immediate concerns 
for Boko Haram.  
One of the reasons of this relationship between religious and political organizations is the history of northern 
Nigeria and the dynamics of Nigerian politics, but another factor is the mobilization capacity of Mosques. 
Mosque communities in northern Nigeria are already organized communities and as the case with the hisba` 
group, they also have a group of organized young men willing to apply violence. Their leaders will often 
have political ambition, or at least a political alternative based on Islam, and access to political leaders due to 
the amount of people organized in their Mosque. Many Islamic groups will often be well-funded and form 
part of some international network. While there is nothing inherently violent about these communities they 
do provide the infrastructure for violent mobilization. Leaders, both religious and political, have taken 
advantage of this.   
The mobilization capacity of a Mosque community is also due to the possibility of constant interpretation 
and reinterpretation of Islamic text. Islam is a living religion in this sense. Political and religious 
entrepreneurs can facilitate this dynamic to compete on the religious marketplace by offering an innovative 
religious stance and interpretations, and by establishing a new Mosque. In the logic of Salafism this is often 
done by claiming that other organizations are conducting bid’a or taghut, essentially claiming that they are 
un-Islamic.240       
Boko Haram’s interpretation of Salafism is constantly at odds with important factors in a Nigerian’s 
everyday life: democracy, technology, education, Christianity, other denominations of Islam etc. Their logic 
is therefore inherently confrontational. This does not mean there is a linear development between Salafism 
and armed rebellion. But conflicts, either violent or non-violent, are inevitable. Salafism in Nigeria was 
appealing to middle class professional with modern educations precisely because it breaks down the 
traditional hierarchy in and outside the mosques. Yusuf came from an almajiri, madrassa often for orphans, 
background but rose to prominence within the Salafi organizations.241 His story exemplifies the break with 
the establishment.    
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The debate on religion as a cause of insurgency in Africa is underdeveloped and was therefore excluded from 
the second chapter. Religion can be one of the causes of insurgency, by its interaction with politics. Politics 
is massively corrupt and violent, so when religion is activated for secular, political, ends it also turns violent. 
A more novel angle approach to Islam as a cause of insurgency is to look at its structural features: organized 
community with political ambitions leaders, who are connected internationally and nationally with political 
leaders. The interesting question is when can these communities be mobilized for violence? Sharia 
implementation in Nigeria is clearly an issue which enables violence. This is compounded in an already 
heavily contested political scene where the application of violent means is commonplace.   
4-Conclusion  
 
Since Boko Haram initiated an insurgency in northern Nigeria it has attracted ample analytical attention. A 
significant amount of the spotlight has focused on the causes of the insurgency. The most common 
explanation found in the literature is the socio-economic conditions of Boko Haram’s environment. Another 
set of explanations explore the religious aspects of Boko Haram. These often identify the group as the latest 
leaf on Nigeria’s tree of Islamic militancy, the roots of which date back to dan Fodio’s jihad against the Habe 
rulers of Hausaland in the early 19th century. One branch of the religious explanations point out the 
intersectionality between politics and religion in northern Nigeria, another points to Boko Haram’s role in 
the Global Jihad movement. Another dominant explanation looks at the instability across the Sahel belt and 
understands Boko Haram as forming part of this trend of regional instability. 
Each of the explanations have strengths and weakness, but surprisingly none of the studies compare Boko 
Haram’s insurgency to other insurgencies in Nigeria (MASSOB, MEND, or OPC) or to other insurgencies 
on the continent, present: MUJWA, AQIM, Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen (al-Shabaab), Lord’s 
Resistance Army (LRA) etc., or past: Revolutionary United Front (RUF), National Patriotic Front of Liberia 
(NPFL), National Resistance Army (NRA), Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) etc. This thesis addressed this 
gap in the literature by asking the popular question: What are the main causes of the Boko Haram 
insurgency? It answers it by relating the debates in the academic literature on causes of insurgency in 
independent Africa to Boko Haram.    
The four main debates identified in the literature are greed, grievance, ethnicity, and the state, each of which 
were used accordingly to explore the causes of Boko Haram’s insurgency and in return identify gaps in the 
debates. Religion was initially pointed out as an underdeveloped debate, demanding further attention. 
Religion as a cause of Boko Haram’s insurgency was explored to this end.  
The greed debate argues that conflicts in Africa are more likely to occur where resources are plentiful, in 
other words resource rich environments. Boko Haram is characterized by the opposite as the insurgency is 
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conducted in an environment marked by decades of environmental and economic degradation, and is 
currently a resource scarce environment. It is therefore highly unconvincing that Boko Haram’s insurgency 
was caused by the greed for natural resources. 
The second debate is grievance as a cause of insurgency. The common argument within this debate is that the 
perception of relative group-based grievance is conducive to insurgency. If the group’s political elite is also 
excluded from power, the risk of insurgency is further increased due to the elite’s incentive to gain access to 
power by violent means. Data on perception is difficult to come by so most studies rely on observable data 
and assume that such data translates into perception. The North East, where Boko Haram initiated the 
insurgency, is political and socio-economically deprived in comparison to the five other geopolitical zones of 
Nigeria. But the sheer amount of insurgencies confuses findings on the dependent variable: insurgency and it 
is unconvincing that the region’s relative grievance is a main cause of the insurgency. The lack of job 
opportunities in the region due to the loss of industries following the SAPs and the oil boom, the lack of 
educational opportunities, and the increased pressure on the urban job market due to the degradation of Lake 
Chad, and the expansion of Sahara is a more convincing argument as to why the life of an insurgent is 
attractive to some young men. In this regard poor socio-economic opportunities should be understood as a 
main cause of the insurgency by allowing for cheap recruitment. This repeats the conclusion made by Fearon 
and Laitin, who included cases from across the globe in their study.242 
Ethnicity is the third debate identified in the academic literature. Boko Haram has generally not organized 
along ethnic lines, but has instead focus on their ideological identity: Salafism. This lack of ethnic 
mobilization resonates well with the literature, because the ethnic group from where most Boko Haram 
members originate is the Kanuri, who are a national minority. The group is also a minority group in a 
regional perspective. It is therefore not numerically viable to mobilize an insurgency based on the platform 
provided by the Kanuri ethnic identity, if a group has ambitions beyond the immediate few states in the 
North East. It would simply exclude too many potential recruits from non-Kanuri ethnic groups. Neither does 
the Kanuri identity grant access to the competition for state resources.  
The last debate identified in the literature is the state as a cause of insurgency. Two general assumptions on 
the state as a cause of insurgency are made here. That weakness of specific institutions and that specific 
political behaviour can cause insurgency. Both can be consequences of democratization, which is the 
overriding theme of Nigeria’s recent history. Godfatherism developed due to democratization and the 
weakness of the security sectors was deepened due to democratization. Godfatherism meant that the hisba 
groups were mobilized for political ends and the weak security sectors allowed for them to grow and develop 
into insurgencies. Both of these follow the general assumption. Effects of democratization on societies where 
                                                          
242
 J. Fearon & D. Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War”, (2003):88. 
58 
 
religious groups are already integrated into the political system is however often left out of the general 
literature.  
The last category from which the thesis explored the causes of Boko Haram’s insurgency is religion. The 
historical competition between religious organizations has been intense and often violent. Islam was more 
recently included in the political debate as a means to stop the endemic corruption, but once Sharia was 
politically activated, it combined with the religious competition, decentralized nature of Islam, and Nigerian 
politics, turned certain groups violent. This is not exclusive to the immediate period around the Sharia 
debate, but has been a reoccurring theme in Nigeria’s history. It however exemplifies how religious 
principles can be activated in politics, and by this be a source of conflict.   
Further studies on religion as a cause of conflict in Africa could therefore focus on the consequences of 
facilitating religious means to secular ends. Another aspect of religion that has been significant in Boko 
Haram’s insurgency is the organizational capacity of the communities affiliated with mosques. The 
organizational structure of a mosque provides an infrastructure that is favourable for insurgency, and can be 
used by religious and political entrepreneurs to this end. 
Political and religious entrepreneurs can use Islam to enter the religious marketplace because Islam is a 
living religion: it is open for interpretation and re-interpretation. This is a dynamic worth exploring further in 
relation to insurgency, especially within the logic of Salafism. One aspect of this could be to examine when 
Salafism have been activated in order to apply violence.     
The primary cause of Boko Haram’s insurgency lies in the dynamics of Nigerian politics, and Boko Haram 
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